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Abstract 
Against the rising global concern of how to achieve sustainable output expansion in 
food, we document the main outcomes of post-Soviet agricultural recovery and restruc-
turing in the Kazakhstan grain region. Together with an expansion of cropland area and 
increasing capital input, real agricultural value added has almost doubled within the re-
cent decade. Privatisation legislation has allowed private ownership of land. However, 
access to state land and capital continues to be strongly regulated, and private lenders 
even turn away from agriculture. There are now three dominant groups of agricultural 
producers in the region: large agricultural enterprises and smaller individual farms 
mostly engaged in grain, and tiny household economies focusing on vegetable and live-
stock. While agricultural enterprises have been growing more persistently than individ-
ual farms in recent years, average land productivity of both farm types is practically 
identical and wheat yields are even higher in individual farms. Both vertically and hori-
zontally integrated agroholdings have emerged among the agricultural enterprises and 
have brought outside investment and management to the region. With stable employ-
ment in agriculture, nominal consumption spending of rural households has tripled over 
the last decade and has risen much faster than the costs of living. While North Kazakh-
stan looks much like a success story, constrained factor markets are likely to dampen 
further growth. The Kazakh government should improve the legal conditions for a func-
tioning land rental market, avoid driving commercial lenders out of the market, and 
make sure that future access to qualified labour in agriculture is warranted. 
Keywords: Agricultural productivity, agricultural transition, farm organisation, Ka-
zakhstan. 
JEL-codes: O13; P32; Q12; Q15.   v 
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The evidence presented in this study documents a widely positive development of agri-
cultural production in the three major grain producing provinces of Kazakhstan (the 
North-Kazakh Grain Region, NKGR). With the exception of the drought year 2010, ag-
ricultural output has consistently increased (Figure I). Together with an expansion of 
cropland area and increasing capital input, real agricultural value added has almost dou-
bled within a decade.  
While hesitant in the early transition period, privatisation legislation has now allowed 
private ownership of land and has put the basic preconditions for a capitalist mode of 
agricultural production into place. There are three dominant groups of agricultural 
producers in the NKGR that emerged from the restructuring processes of the transition 
period. The first group consists of large agricultural enterprises in the form of limited 
liability partnerships, the second group of smaller individual farms, and the third of tiny 
household economies. Agricultural enterprises cultivate about 10,000 ha per farm on 
average and control almost three quarters of agricultural land in the NKGR. Individual 
farms emerged as a new type of producer in the process of land privatisation and culti-
vate one quarter of the land, with an average farm size of around 560 ha. Household 
economies mostly engage in labour-intensive vegetable and livestock production. In re-
lation to the other two types of farming organisations, agricultural land use by the latter 
is minimal, but their share in agricultural output is about 40 percent.  
Figure I:  Contribution of different farm types to Gross Agricultural Output, 
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Agricultural enterprises Individual farms Household economies  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on official statistics, see Figure 15 in main text.  
Compared to other post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan is distinct in having established 
a significant individual farm sector side-by-side with the reformed agricultural enter-
prises in its primary grain producing region. While agricultural enterprises have been 
growing more persistently than individual farms in recent years, average land productiv-
ity is practically identical and wheat yields tend to be even higher in individual farms. 
Registration procedures for individual farms are simpler and tax obligations lower than 
for enterprises. However, among government officials, an ideological bias against indi-
vii viii 
vidual farming seems to prevail. Both vertically and horizontally integrated agrohold-
ings have emerged among the agricultural enterprises and have brought outside in-
vestment and management to the region. While we document some of the agrohold-
ings’ activities, which are chiefly in grain production and trade, they are generally little 
transparent and few substantive statements about their real impact in rural areas can be 
made. 
Government support to agriculture has been rising recently, and is based on a highly 
centralised system of area-, output-, and input-related subsidies. The government is also 
engaged in grain procurement and storage to achieve national food security goals, but 
does no longer interfere in on-farm production decisions. Subsidised funding for agri-
cultural investments is provided through the state-owned holding KazAgro. These sub-
sidies offer the agricultural sector access to the governments’ tax receipts and oil reve-
nues. However, the implementation system chosen gives little room for the type of de-
centralised market institutions which have advantages in information processing, are 
less prone to elite capture and have been instrumental for sustainable rural development 
in other contexts. Despite the still tremendous financing needs, private lenders even 
turned away from the agricultural sector. 
These partly questionable government activities notwithstanding, agricultural recovery 
in the NKGR has brought clear and measurable benefits to the rural population. With 
stable employment in agriculture, consumption spending by rural households has tripled 
over the last decade and has risen much faster than the costs of living (Figure II). Real 
monthly consumption expenditures by rural households doubled between 2003 and 
2009, and are higher than in Kazakhstan on average. Poverty went down considerably, 
from 40 percent of households below the regional poverty line in 2002 to about five 
percent in 2010. Much of this positive development is likely due to rising food prices, 
which trickle down to rural households, and increasing labour scarcity in rural areas. 
Figure II:  Consumption spending and cost of living for rural households in 


















Rural consumption spending NKGR Cost of living NKGR  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on official statistics, see Figure 24 in main text.    ix 
Policy recommendations 
Access to land and capital for agricultural producers continues to be constrained by 
strongly regulated and governmentally controlled allocation systems. While land sales 
are now possible in principle, such transactions require large capital investments and a 
long-term planning horizon. Rural entrepreneurs rarely fulfil these conditions, so that 
land sales remain few. For more immediate adjustments in land use, the development of 
land rental markets is desirable. However, the legal provisions for such rental transac-
tions are not sufficient. In particular, to what extent privatisation beneficiaries in the 
NKGR who contributed their share to the stock of an agricultural enterprise under the 
2003 legislation can still engage in land rental markets is unclear. Furthermore, land 
shares cannot be contributed to individual farms. It is also unknown to what extent lease 
and sublease of land are still carried out informally, contrary to the 2003 land code pro-
visions. More transparency and firmer as well as more practical legislation that creates a 
level playing field for all farm types would likely stimulate land rentals and thus lead to 
further efficiency gains in the medium term. 
The state agency KazAgro appears to be one of the few viable sources of finance for 
many farmers, as commercial banks have partly withdrawn from the agricultural sector. 
However, it is unlikely that state-administered credit supply is very effective in target-
ing the most promising investments in agriculture. While some agricultural enterprises 
apparently have access to outside equity, many individual farmers would benefit from a 
more competitive and less centrally administered agricultural credit system, possibly 
based on (true) cooperative principles. 
Many farmers interviewed in the case studies were concerned about future access to 
qualified labour. The Kazakh government should make sure that future labour de-
mands in terms of educated people in working age can be met. A review of the demo-
graphic outlook for rural areas is recommended. 
Recent increases in agricultural policy spending have led to a wide array of measures, 
including various types of input subsidies and production-related direct payments. To 
what extent these measures follow a consistent sector strategy with specific policy 
goals is not visible and the effectiveness of the measures thus difficult to evaluate. 
Many are hardly compatible with WTO requirements. A more focused and less distor-
tionary policy approach is recommended. Systematic upgrading of the rural transport 
infrastructure is likely to have a more beneficial long run impact than indiscriminate 
subsidy distribution. 
Future research needs 
Labour supervision and the design of incentive-compatible employment contracts are 
persistent issues for many managers. In this management field, little systematic knowl-
edge is available about actual practice and possible options, including new technologies 
based on satellite imaging.  
If labour is becoming scarce in rural Kazakhstan, this sheds new light on some strategic 
notions of rural development. Traditionally, in order to raise living standards, rural ar-
eas with abundant labour would have to generate off-farm employment opportunities 
and/or depend heavily on (regional) migration opportunities in more dynamic urban ar-x 
eas. In view of stable population numbers and strongly rising incomes, it is an open 
question whether this is an appropriate strategy for Kazakhstan.  
No disaggregate, farm-level data is available that allows substantial comparisons in the 
performance of agricultural enterprises, individual farms and household economies. As 
a result, no definitive statements can be made about which type of organisation is more 
beneficial in terms of productivity, employment and income generation, more innova-
tive, and better suited to meet the demands of modern food chains. Given the tremen-
dous range of farm sizes observed in a homogenous natural and political environment, 
the NKGR represents a potentially fruitful object to investigate long-standing analytical 
issues concerning the relative advantages of small versus large farms. 
There is clear evidence that many households produce a surplus to their subsistence 
needs which is sought by, for example, urban consumers. In which way these household 
operations could and should be commercialised and what this means for other types of 
agricultural producers needs to be investigated further. 
More research on the interactions among different types of agricultural producers is 
also needed because they may become crucial for future agricultural development in the 
NKGR. If linkages indeed provide mutual benefits for the involved parties, they may 
turn into resource-providing contracts, i.e. arrangements that allow input flows from 
larger to smaller businesses in exchange for some output relevant for the larger busi-
ness. In addition to traditional inputs such as fuel or feed, which are fully commercial-
ised today, this could also be knowledge, access to risk management tools, or storage 
and marketing logistics. The output provided by the smaller business could be some ef-
fort-intensive (intermediate) product, such as raw milk, or simply labour force. If there 
are economic advantages in keeping different types and sizes of producers separate, it is 
likely that a more refined network of contracts may emerge that exploits the compara-
tive advantages of each organisational type. However, if there are no such economic 
benefits to separation, the mutual relationship is more likely to be one of competition 
and ultimate takeover by the stronger party. A third option is the increasing specialisa-
tion of different farm types in various product segments.  
There is little information about who has entered agricultural production in North Ka-
zakhstan and why. The explanations range from external investors bringing their own 
management, over various “local” entrepreneurs who have been more or less engaged in 
agricultural activities in the past, to household members who continue small-scale op-
erations in vegetable and livestock to make their own living but also earn some revenue 
from surplus sales. As farm enterprises in the NKGR have persistently been created and 
dismantled recently, and given the importance of the management for successful farm-
ing operations, this is a question of actual relevance. Relative political power and access 
to information and resources by these different types of managers may well have impli-
cations for future structural change in agriculture.  
1  Introduction 
Recent price hikes in agricultural commodities worldwide brought the issue of global 
food security back on the political agenda. They also led to a rediscovery of the agricul-
tural sector not only as an essential resource for human livelihoods, but also as a poten-
tially profitable investment target. Moreover, claims were made that productivity in-
creases would only be possible if small-scale farms were replaced by commercial large-
scale agro-firms (Collier, 2008). However, media reports on increasing interest in farm-
land by both private and public investors at the same time raised concerns about the so-
cial and economic implications of massive agricultural transformations for rural socie-
ties (for a summarizing account see Deininger et al., 2011). In this debate, the successor 
countries of the Soviet Union play a special role for at least three reasons. First, particu-
larly the bigger ones of these successors hold currently untapped land reserves suitable 
for food production. Much of this land fell out of production in the course of economic 
transition. Second, productivity of the land that was not idled had declined considerably 
in the 1990s. Both cropland expansion and (re-)intensification thus appear to be promis-
ing strategies for boosting food supply and possibly exports in these countries. Finally, 
in all land-rich successors, a specific post-socialist farming structure emerged from the 
restructuring attempts of the transition period. The conventional description of this 
structure is that large and only partly reformed successors of the former socialist farms 
coexist with household plots mostly geared to subsistence needs (Lerman et al., 2004). 
However, following the Russian ruble devaluation of 1998 and the more recent food 
price boom, the economic environment in rural areas changed and productivity levels 
went up again. The economic and social consequences of this agricultural recovery in 
terms of productivity, farm organisation, and rural income generation are largely un-
studied so far. 
Against this backdrop, the current study takes a fresh look at agricultural development 
in the Central Asian Republic of Kazakhstan. Already now, Kazakhstan is among the 
world’s ten largest producers and five largest exporters of wheat (OECD 2011, 99). To-
gether with Russia and Ukraine, it is considered as a future main player in world grain 
supply. About 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s wheat is produced in the three north-Kazakh 
provinces Akmola, Kostanay, and North-Kazakhstan, two of which have borders with 
Russia. In the following, we label these three provinces the North-Kazakh Grain Region 
(NKGR). This region covers about 440,000 km² and hosts a population of 2.3 million 
people. First developed under the Soviet Virgin Lands Campaign in the 1950s, the 
sparsely populated region suffers from problematic climate conditions for crop produc-
tion, notably a high risk of drought as well as early and late frost. Grain yields during 
Soviet times were highly volatile and remained below 10 dt/ha on average. After na-
tional independence, the grain factories established under Soviet rule fell into crisis and 
substantial issues of privatization and restructuring were raised. However, partly aided 
by its oil revenues, Kazakhstan managed to avoid the political instability or paralysis 
typical of other Central Asian republics. In the new millennium, together with rising 
food prices, political stability went hand in hand with a notable recovery of agricultural 
1 2 
production in the NKGR.
1 While the global financial crisis reached Kazakhstan already 
in 2007, it was weathered comparatively well. Contrary to the situation in other former 
Soviet republics, the socialist farming structure was neither preserved nor dismantled 
completely. It was rather reformed gradually and has evolved into a tri-modal structure 
consisting of large agricultural enterprises, smaller individual farms, and tiny household 
plots. 
While North Kazakhstan is a success story in terms of recent agricultural productivity 
increases, it also represents an interesting field of study for more fundamental issues in 
farm organisation and intensification that are of global relevance. Total cropland area in 
the NKGR has increased by one half since 2001, agricultural value added doubled, and 
investments in farming operations even went up fivefold in the same period. It is thus an 
area where substantial agricultural intensification has taken place recently, also by ex-
tending farming into lands that fell idle after the collapse of socialism. At the same time, 
farming organisation has changed significantly. On the one hand, a new layer of indi-
vidual farms has emerged which now cultivate about one quarter of agricultural land.
2 
On the other hand, agriculture in the NKGR has become the target of outside investors 
who began to establish huge vertically integrated grain companies, so called agrohold-
ings. In this study, we document some of the main outcomes of agricultural recovery 
and restructuring in the region. We shed light on the political reforms that formed the 
background of this process and that led to the diverse agricultural structure observed to-
day. Furthermore, we investigate the social and economic implications of agricultural 
restructuring for the population living in rural areas of the NKGR. By focusing on the 
NKGR, we avoid statements about average developments in Kazakhstan as a whole, 
which are highly problematic given the regional diversity of agricultural production and 
farming structures. In several respects, we thus update Gray’s (2000) thorough review 
of farm restructuring progress undertaken by the end of the first transition decade. 
The quantitative part of the study is based on statistical information mostly taken from 
the Kazakh National Statistical Agency, data which has not been published in English 
before.
3 In addition to this data, we utilise a number of key documents prepared by in-
ternational organisations on agricultural development in Kazakhstan (in particular 
Dudwick et al., 2007; Gray, 2000; USAID, 2005) as well as first-hand experience from 
a study tour to the NKGR conducted by the authors in April/May 2011. Farm case stud-
ies are documented in the appendix to this study. 
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of overall agricultural 
development in the NKGR by presenting a number of key statistical figures on output 
                                                 
1   For many Western observers, there has been actually too much stability in Kazakhstan, given that the 
President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has been in office for 20 years now, and with democ-
ratic elections playing a comparatively minor role in the Kazakh political system. 
2   Following established terminology in Russian, these individual farms are called “fermer” or “peasant” 
farms in Kazakhstan. However, unlike the conventional understanding in other development contexts, 
these farms are neither operated by peasants in the classic sense nor are they small. We therefore use 
the more neutral terminology “individual farms”, indicating operations run by a natural person rather 
than an incorporated agricultural enterprise. 
3   The Kazakh Statistical Agency has set a benchmark in publishing a host of statistical information as a 
free download at www.stat.kz. This includes all major statistical yearbooks issued in recent years as 
pdf’s, as well as more regionally differentiated data collections and studies. This material is usually 
published in Russian and, more recently, in Kazakh. We give the exact source of our data next to each 
figure presented in the text.   3 
and factor use. In section 3, the main steps of farm restructuring and agricultural policy 
after 1990 are summarised. Section 4 takes current statistical data on structural change 
to characterise and tentatively evaluate the different farming organisations present in the 
NKGR today. Section 5 looks at the social implications of agricultural restructuring and 
section 6 concludes.  
2  Agricultural recovery in the North-Kazakh Grain Region: 
an overview 
In the past decade, agricultural production in the NKGR has displayed a remarkable re-
covery from the earlier transition crisis. Based on official statistics, we portray the main 
aspects of this recovery in the subsequent section. We start with land use. The overall 
reduction of cropland area after national independence was substantial. In 2000, it had 
decreased to about one half of its 1990 value in Kazakhstan as a whole, and to about 
two thirds in the NKGR. However, agricultural land use has been expanding consis-
tently since 2001. It picked up again in the early 2000s and increased by almost a half 
between 2000 and 2010 (Figure 1). This is about 80 percent of the 1990 value. As the 
parallel increase of the lines for the NKGR and Kazakhstan as a whole demonstrate, al-
most all cropland expansion in Kazakhstan took place in the NKGR. Since 2000, about 
five million ha of cropland have been put into production again. 
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North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2000-2010: electronic table provided at www.stat.kz; 1990: Sta-
tistical Yearbook 50 Years Start of the Virgin Lands Campaign 1953-2003, Almaty 2003. 
Along with cropland expansion went an increase in input use. Figure 2 shows the rise in 
mineral fertiliser application. Starting from a practical absence of application in 2000, 
now about five percent of all cropland receive fertiliser, though with considerable an-
nual fluctuation. The Kazakh Statistical Agency reports doses in the range of 30 to 40 
kg pure nutrient per ha (Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in Ka-
zakhstan 2005-2009, 143). A possible explanation for the notable dip in 2008 is liquid-
ity shortages, as the global financial crisis led Kazakh banks to drastically cut down 
their short-term lending early in the crisis (Box 1). 
5 6 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2000-2004: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 229; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2005-2009, 142. 
Box 1:  A chronicle of recent economic shocks 
August 2007: The first wave of the global financial crisis hits Kazakhstan, leading to plummeting stock 
indices and real estate prices in the cities. In the course of the crisis, Kazakhstan experiences an economic 
recession (in 2008/2009) and substantial pressure on its banking system as well as its currency exchange 
rate. Short-term lending to agriculture declines substantially.  
April 2008: After spiralling global food prices, the government imposes a temporary export ban on 
grains. The ban is lifted on 1 September 2008. No further trade restrictions have been enacted since. 
February 2009: As a result of the financial crisis, the Kazakh tenge (KZT) loses 20 percent of its ex-
change value against the USD. More recently, the exchange rate has floated around 145 KZT/USD. In 
2009, KazAgro, the state development agency for agriculture, receives extraordinary financial support 
from the government’s National Welfare Fund. The latter accumulates the state income from oil sales. 
Summer 2010: An extreme drought leads to severe harvest losses and reduced grain exports. 
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; D. Oshakbayev, personal communication; Lillis 2008. 
Between 2003 and 2009, investment in agricultural fixed assets increased five-fold 
(Figure 3). Relative to Kazakhstan as a whole, almost all the increase in investment oc-
curred in the NKGR. In practice, this primary meant investments in buildings and ma-
chinery, leading to a substantial upgrading of farming technologies (Box 2, Picture 1).   7 
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North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2003-2007: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 
388; 2008-2009: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 368. 
Box 2:  Grain production technology in the NKGR 
Under the dry climatic conditions of North Kazakhstan, timely and moisture-conserving field operations 
are of crucial importance for successful plant production (Longmire and Moldashev, 1999). This in turn 
requires appropriate production technologies. 
“Enbek Bereke”, a 12,000 ha crop farm 150 km north of Astana, uses latest zero-tillage technology of 
Western origin and a non-selective herbicide for clearing the weeds before sowing. The sowing campaign 
is from May 5 to June 5, there is one additional spraying operation using a self-propelled sprayer. Fertil-
iser is applied simultaneously with sowing. Machinery operations are monitored by a full-fledged GPS 
imaging system. 
“Saratomar” individual farm also uses zero-tillage technology and cultivates 650 ha of wheat in monocul-
ture, with the occasional exception of oats or peas to fix nitrogen in the soil. A GPS-based system is used 
to control spraying operations and the performance of tractor drivers. It is not used for sowing, as the 
sowing campaign is only one week. According to the agronomist, the minimum subscription to GPS ser-
vices is one month, so it is too expensive for such a small farm. 
Over recent years, the manager of “Beloe Osero” individual farm has continuously increased his stock of 
used farming machinery, generally of Soviet origin (e.g., three K-700 tractors). He recently bought two 
new combine harvesters. For keeping his machinery park running, he has gathered an arsenal of second-
hand and partly dysfunctional machinery on his farm, which is used as a reservoir of spare parts. Improvi-
sation is often necessary, but his staff is used to such working conditions. 
Source: Case studies 1, 4, 6, appendix. 8 
Picture 1:  Modern drilling equipment on agricultural enterprise 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011. 






1989 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Kostanay North-Kazakhstan Akmola Kazakhstan  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on 1990: Statistical Yearbook 50 Years Start of the Virgin Lands 
Campaign 1953-2003, 83; 2000-2002: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 210; 2003-2010: electronic table provided at www.stat.kz. 
In response to intensified land use and increased use of fixed capital, crop yields have 
stabilised above the levels reported under Soviet rule in the late 1980s (Figure 4). This 
is at least true for the more northern and thus climatically favoured regions North-
Kazakhstan and Kostanay, where the three-year moving average yields of summer   9 
wheat have reached levels of 13 to 14 dt/ha.
4 The more southern and thus drier region 
Akmola stands at about 9 dt/ha. 
With fluctuations, grain prices doubled between 2001 and 2009 (Figure 5). However, in 
the same period, nominal wages in agriculture rose even faster to about four and a half 
times their 2001 level. Production costs thus increased perceptibly as well. Neverthe-
less, reflecting the trends in land expansion and intensification, real agricultural value 
added (the real regional product of agriculture) in the NKGR has also almost doubled 
since 2002 (Figure 6).  












2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Grain prices Wages in agriculture  
Notes:  Grain index is simple average of provincial grain indices for Akmola, North-Kazakhstan and 
Kostanay, wage index is average weighted by employees in agriculture in these provinces. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on 2001-2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
96, 429; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 114, 383. 
                                                 
4   The three-year moving average in a given year is the mean of the previous, current, and subsequent 
years, calculated for all years for which both neighbouring values are available. 10 
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North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan  
Note:  Nominal product deflated by agricultural sales price index. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on 2001-2003: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
203, 207; 2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 196, 200; 2005-2009: Sta-
tistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 191, 195; Agricultural sales price index pro-
vided at www.stat.kz. 




































Note:  Figures based on marketing years; * 2011/2012 are projections. 
Source:  USDA, PSD Online database. 
The previous figures draw a consistent picture of cropland expansion, agricultural inten-
sification and productivity increases in the NKGR. These in turn provided the basis for 
increasing wheat exports which made Kazakhstan an important player on world grain 
markets (Figure 7). Which were the drivers of this notable recovery? While output   11 
prices went up in line with global trends, Figure 5 shows that this is only part of the 
story, as wage expenses increased even stronger. It is likely that substantial restructuring 
processes in the agricultural sector contributed much to the positive developments. 
These are therefore investigated in the subsequent chapter.  
3  Restructuring policies after 1990 
3.1  Farm restructuring legislation and its main outcomes 
During the past 20 years, land reform legislation in Kazakhstan underwent a major para-
digm change. In the 1990s, the paradigm was that all land remained in state ownership, 
while formal shares in former collective farm land were rented to rural citizens on a 
long-term basis. These land shares could be used for own cultivation or leased to end 
users in a secondary transaction. After 2001, the paradigm shifted towards full private 
ownership of land and limitations on the rental terms of state land. Since then, a land 
sales market has emerged, but it has remained thin. Most land is still rented from the 
government at a normatively set low price. A complete transition to widespread private 
ownership and transactions in land has not materialised yet. Even so, substantial restruc-
turing of farms has taken place, and a tri-modal farming structure of agricultural enter-
prises, individual farms, and household plots has emerged. Table 1 summarises the main 
steps in this process.  
1990-1994: Early reform steps, little profound restructuring 
The early transition period was characterized by many formal rather than substantial 
changes. Collective farms were registered as private legal entities, but the farming proc-
ess often remained unchanged (Gray 2000, 13). As early as May 1990, the government 
enacted the first national law “On Peasant Farms in the Kazakh Socialist Soviet Repub-
lic” (Table 1). According to this law, it was legal for workers to leave the collective 
farms and to start individual farming, based on inheritable use rights to land. In 1992, 
the Kazakh government formally allowed managers of the collective farms to transform 
the large farms into smaller agricultural enterprises. Such enterprises could be joint 
stock companies, collective enterprises, and producer cooperatives (USAID, 2005, 3).  
In 1993, farm input markets were widely liberalised. The state continued to control out-
put prices and quantities, at the same time providing soft credits to unprofitable farming 
operations. These circumstances triggered the severe farm solvency crisis of the follow-
ing years, which would lead to widespread land abandonment and the frequent collapse 
and re-establishment of farm organisations (Gray 2000, 7, 10).  
In 1994, a decree was passed which stipulated that 10 percent of state farm property 
were handed over to the former directors that had served as such for at least 20 years. It 
was a form of gratification. Another 10 percent of the former collective land was at the 
disposal of the farm directors for 5 years. The remaining 80 percent was intended to be 
distributed among farm members. By 1995, most state and collective farms had for-
mally disappeared, although little actual restructuring had taken place. The first individ-
ual farms had emerged. Usually they were created by the management staff of former 
state farms (USAID 2005, 4).  
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Table 1:   Main reform initiatives and their effects on farm restructuring 
Year  Reform initiatives  Restructuring outcomes 
1990  National law “On peasant farms in the 
Kazakh SSR”. Legalisation of individual 
farming based on inheritable land use 
rights. 
First spontaneously created individual farms, 
mostly by state farm cadres. 
1991  National independency, followed by re-
form legislation in various areas.  
Start of formal conversion of state and collective 
farms into producer cooperatives and other legal 
forms, little substantial restructuring. 
1993  Liberalisation of input markets, output 
prices and quantities remain controlled 
by government, continuing soft budget 
constraints. Elimination of collective 
form of property. 
Origin of liquidity crisis in agriculture. 
1995  Law “On land” institutes share privatisa-
tion. Withdrawal to form individual 
farms is allowed.  
Government ownership of land, but rural residents 
obtain up to 99-year leasehold of “conditional 
land shares” without specific demarcation of 
plots. Three options: (1) creation of an individual 
farm, (2) formation of an agricultural enterprise, 
(3) sublease to other users. Inheritable private 
ownership of household plots and dacha land is 
acknowledged. 
1997  Government instructions encourage for-
mation of agricultural enterprises and 
“personification” of land. 
Shares are increasingly transferred into limited 
liability partnerships, lottery procedures to allo-
cate land plots to individuals prove difficult. 
1998  Application of bankruptcy procedures as 
response to widespread insolvencies. 
Conversion of most producer cooperatives into 
limited partnerships, concentration of formal own-
ership into hands of management following offi-
cial recommendations, new management and out-
side investors become active, but creation of indi-
vidual farms is also accelerated. 
2001  Terms of lease for existing and future 
contracts reduced to 49 years, an-
nouncement that subleases will have to 
be terminated. 
Increasing uncertainty about security of land ten-
ure. 
2003  New land code adopted, introducing pri-
vate ownership of farmland. Sublease of 
shares prohibited, land either to be self-
cultivated or contributed as capital share 
to agricultural enterprise, “merging small 
farms campaign”. 
Implementation in 2005, preferred option of for-
mer sub-lessors is to contribute to stock of agri-
cultural enterprises, but creation of individual 
farms is also exercised. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
1995-1997: Share privatisation, emergence of limited partnerships 
In 1995, the law “On land” formalised land privatisation to rural residents, that is farm 
workers and staff, pensioners, as well as persons working in the social sphere such as 
doctors and teachers. The law enabled beneficiaries to lease “conditional land shares” 
for a period of 3 to 99 years from the government, but purchase and private ownership 
of land were not allowed. Thus, the state remained the legal owner and could reclaim 
land that was not cultivated for a period of three years. The main legal options for hold-  15 
ers of conditional land shares were as follows: (1) Shares could be joined to form an ag-
ricultural enterprise; (2) shares could be redeemed to withdraw land plots in order to 
form individual farms; and (3) shares could be subleased to other users. The specific lo-
cation of land shares was usually not known. This fact facilitated the buyout by large 
investors (Gray 2000, 9). By 2002, 18 percent of shareholders had exercised option (1), 
mostly former managers and their collaborators (Dudwick et al. 2007, 46). Option (2) 
was exercised by 29 percent of beneficiaries, usually people with some farming experi-
ence. Option (3) was exercised by 28 percent, mostly pensioners and people without ag-
ricultural background, but also farm workers. For the latter, it provided a way to partici-
pate in the assets of the former collective farms, in addition to their salary. With regard 
to household plots and dacha land, inheritable private ownership was granted immedi-
ately with implementation of the law (USAID 2005, 4). 
In this period, a legal form of corporate farming emerged that would play a dominant 
role in the NKGR, the limited liability partnership (Gray 2000, 8). This form of partner-
ship allowed the concentration of shares in the hands of the director and was widely 
supported by government authorities. It was a means to continue large scale farming op-
erations under post-socialist conditions without having to deal with a large number of 
decision makers (as formally required in producer cooperatives). In the coming years, 
such limited partnerships would form the backbone of agricultural enterprises in the 
NKGR. Together with joint stock companies and producer cooperatives, they represent 
the group of agricultural enterprises. They are legal persons recognised by the Civil 
Code (Box 3). 
In 1997, the government gave instructions to issue land titles to the rural population, and 
to promote the demarcation and thus “personification” of land (Gray 2000, 9). However, 
the procedure based on drawing a lottery was difficult to administer and proceeded 
slowly, usually only when individual farms were created (USAID 2005, 29). 
1998-2002: Bankruptcy procedures accelerate restructuring, coexistence of corpo-
rate and individual farms 
A result of half-hearted restructuring and adverse price policies (Pomfret 2008) was that 
by 1998 most corporate farms were loss-making and illiquid. The government enacted a 
procedure of bankruptcy proceedings (see Gray 2000 for a thorough review). This time 
it aimed more at supporting profitable farms and at abandoning farms that were not vi-
able. The latter were taken through a bankruptcy procedure. This period saw the wide-
spread conversion of producer cooperatives into limited partnerships, and the concentra-
tion of formal ownership (land shares) into the hands of directors. It often went hand in 
hand with the installation of new outside management, purchases by outside investors 
including input suppliers, fragmentation into smaller units, and the collapse of farming 
in the least favourable regions (Gray 2000, 15-17; Picture 2). Similar to the situation in 
other post-Soviet countries, farm workers and other lower-rank beneficiaries were likely 
the least informed about their options and the consequences of their choices (Dudwick 
et al., 2007, 50; Petrick and Carter, 2009). Even so, the creation of individual farms was 
also accelerated, so that among the registered farms a significant number of both corpo-
rate and individual farms began to coexist. As household economies continued to con-
tribute a significant share in gross agricultural output (see section 4.1), a tri-modal agri-
cultural structure had emerged. 16 
Picture 2:  Obsolete grain storage 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011. 
Box 3:  Background legislation on farm organisation and land use 
The Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (first passed in 1994) recognises four types of legal per-
sons (ch. 2, §2): economic partnerships (khoziaistvennoe tovarishchestvo), joint stock companies 
(aktsionernoe obshchestvo), producer cooperatives (proizvodstvennyi kooperativ), and state enterprises 
(gosudarstvennoe predpriiatne). All these forms are also present in agriculture, although in very unequal 
proportions. In addition, there are individual farms (krest’ianskoe (fermerskoe) khoziaistvo) treated as 
natural persons, and simple partnerships of natural persons (prostoe tovarishchestvo, ch. 12). Registration 
procedures for natural persons are simpler and tax obligations lower. 
The 2003 Land Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan states that (art. 3): 
“Land in the Republic of Kazakhstan is in the public domain. Plots can also be privately owned on terms, 
conditions and limits established by this Code.” 
Owners can be the state, individual citizens, and non-state entities (art. 20). Furthermore, “the owner 
owns the rights to possess, use and dispose of the land belonging to him” (art. 21). Ownership may be 
granted by the state and can be transferred by civil law transactions (i.e., purchases), by inheritance, or 
can emerge from the reorganisation of legal entities (art. 22). Foreigners may own land, but must not use 
it for agricultural production (art. 23). In addition, there are land use rights which are provided by the 
state and which can be granted permanently, temporarily long-term (5-49 years), and temporarily short-
term (up to 5 years) (art. 32; 35). However, transactions among land users in temporary land use rights for 
agricultural production are explicitly prohibited, except for mortgaging and for contributing them to the 
capital stock of an agricultural enterprise (art. 33). 
Kazakh citizens can buy or lease land for up to 49 years in order to establish an individual farm (art. 101). 
By this legal provision, a farmer is assumed to self-cultivate the farm, have specialised agricultural 
knowledge and practical farming experience, and reside in geographical proximity to the farm. Individu-
als who contributed their land use right to the capital stock of an agricultural enterprise, to a partnership 
or to a production cooperative, have the right to withdraw it in kind or be financially compensated for it. 
Source: Online legislation at http://www.minjust.kz, see also http://www.pavlodar.com. 
In 2001 a new law on land was introduced due to which the maximum lease period di-
minished to 49 years instead of 99 years. This alteration applied not only to future leases 
but also to existing ones. In addition, it was announced that subleases of land would   17 
have to be terminated. These changes marked the start of a paradigm shift towards full 
private ownership of land and a turn away from share privatisation exercised so far. As 
a result, considerable uncertainty about future land tenure options was raised among the 
rural population (USAID 2005, 6).  
After 2003: Implementation of new land code, recognition of private land owner-
ship, prohibition of subleasing 
In 2003, the new Kazakh land code was announced and came into force on 1 January 
2005 (Box 3). By recognising individual ownership of agricultural land, it formalised 
the paradigm shift. The widespread practice of subleasing shares (option (3) under the 
1995 legislation) or demarcated land plots received under previous privatisation steps 
was outlawed. The government expressed the view that land should belong to those who 
cultivate it, and that all land owners should be subjected to agricultural taxation and 
regulation. Furthermore, the pending WTO accession of Kazakhstan appeared to be a 
driving force for the reform (USAID 2005, 9). There were important interim provisions 
(article 170) which regulated the abandonment of sublease: (1) Subleased land shares as 
well as land plots could be taken to own cultivation under lease from the government; 
(2) they could be transferred into private ownership by a purchase; and (3) they could be 
contributed as a share to the capital stock of an agricultural enterprise. In case of non-
compliance with these interim regulations, the land could be confiscated. Option (2) of-
fered the remaining opportunity to continue sublease contracts. Individuals could buy 
land from the state, lease it out, and if it was not explicitly prohibited in the contract, the 
leaseholder could then sublet this land (USAID 2005, 23). 
Figure 8:  Disposition of formerly subleased land shares and plots after im-
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on information by the Land Resources Management Agency, as pub-
lished in USAID (2005, 17-18). 
On 1 January 2004, of the 23 million ha of agricultural land in the NKGR, shares 
equivalent to 4.8 million ha and 6.3 million ha of land plots were under sublease and 18 
thus affected by this regulation (based on official statistics of land use and figures by the 
Land Resources Management Agency, as published in USAID 2005, 17-18). Kazakh-
stan as a whole had 79 million ha of agricultural land, of which 14.4 million ha were 
under share and 10.6 million ha under land sublease. Subleasing was thus salient in the 
NKGR, affecting almost half of the land. Figure 8 shows how this land was disposed of 
in the course of land code implementation. Compared to Kazakhstan as a whole, more 
individuals preferred to contribute their shares or land to agricultural enterprises. Land 
purchases played a negligible role in the NKGR (USAID 2005, 23). 
As pointed out by USAID (2005, 27), transferring a share or land plot to the capital 
stock of an agricultural enterprise meant that shareholders would receive a dividend on 
capital in the future, rather than a rent on land as in the past (Box 4). Whereas land rent 
usually used to be a fixed proportion of the harvest (e.g., five percent), the dividend de-
pends on the profitability of the enterprise after managers and workers are paid. There 
were fears that farm managers, in particular outside investors, would manipulate their 
profit figures in order to reduce dividend payments and thus unilaterally favour the em-
ployees of the farm. Not all shareholders may have been fully aware of these implica-
tions (ibid.).  
Box 4:  Land sources of agricultural enterprises in the NKGR 
“Enbek Bereke” is a director-owned corporation and formally a limited liability partnership. All land is in 
long-term leasehold by the villagers who obtained this lease in the course of farm privatisation. The 
leaseholds were transferred into the capital stock of the farm managed by the current director. The direc-
tor came as an outsider to the local community. All primary leaseholders (and thus shareholders of the 
farm) earn an annual dividend based on the performance of the farm. The farm employs 35 workers, in-
cluding administrative personnel. 40 percent of the farm workers are also land owners. Many live in the 
nearby village. 
“Rodina”, a corporate crop and dairy farm, is also organised as a limited liability partnership. Of the 
52,000 ha of land, 51 percent are held by the director, the other 49 percent belong to local residents, who 
receive an annual dividend on their share. 
Source: Case studies 1 and 2, appendix. 
Whereas agricultural enterprises benefitted from the new legislation, individual farms 
were discriminated against, as they could not acquire land shares from rural residents 
via the interim provisions. Moreover, the swift formal implementation of the land code 
was accompanied by a campaign apparently promoted by governmental officials rec-
ommending the merger of small farms into limited partnerships (called “merging small 
farms campaign” by USAID 2005, 23, 31). Perhaps as a sort of counter-reaction, some 
farmers established new types of organisations in the legal form of a simple partnership. 
Such simple partnerships are regarded as natural persons with a status similar to an in-
dividual farm (Box 3, USAID 2005, 20). However, no family ties were required to form 
the partnership. Former parties in a lease contract could thus rescue this relationship in a 
legally acceptable manner by transforming it into a simple partnership.  
While the new land code was implemented formally, there are still reports that informal 
land sublease arrangements prevail in many rural areas to the present day. In the NKGR, 
they likely assure the corporate farms cheap access to land resources.   19 
An evaluation of formal land legislation 
Looking back, formal land legislation in Kazakhstan evolved gradually, if not hesi-
tantly, from the abandonment of collective land ownership in 1993, over share privatisa-
tion with a 99-year leasehold in 1995, to the reduction of this leasehold to 49 years in 
2001, and the recognition of inheritable individual land ownership in the 2003 land 
code, implemented in 2005. Today, the legal provisions for a capitalist mode of land 
ownership and exchange seem to be mostly in place. However, this stepwise process no-
tably changed its target in the course of transition and came at the cost of considerable 
uncertainties for the potential beneficiaries of land privatisation. Furthermore, while le-
gally possible, full private ownership of agricultural land continues to be a rare excep-
tion, at least in the NKGR. Although land purchases have been increasing recently, the 
vast majority of land is still in government ownership.
5 
Whereas land sales are now possible in principle, such transactions require large capital 
investments and a long-term planning horizon. Both conditions are often not met, so 
that land sales remain rare. Land users rather prefer to base their operations on land 
rentals from the government at a low normative price determined by law. The govern-
ment apparently has no political interest in raising its revenues from increasing this nor-
mative price. However, as secondary land rentals are prohibited, short- and medium-
term adjustments in land use outside the land sales market are difficult. They mostly oc-
cur when existing farms change ownership, due to liquidations or mergers, and the land 
shares are transferred to the new owner. There is a tension between the land code legis-
lation making private land ownership the basis of land transactions and the continued 
access to cheap rental land from the government. 
Picture 3:  Traditional fieldworks with caterpillar tractors 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011. 
                                                 
5   Official figures on land sales are hard to obtain, however. This may have to do with media reports on 
large land deals the Kazakh government supposedly negotiates with Chinese investors, which were 
criticised in public. Land access and ownership in the vicinity of the capital Astana is also a politically 
sensitive topic, as there may be influential investors who managed to secure large tracts of this land in 
view of future development. 20 
It is unknown to what extent lease and sublease of land are still carried out informally, 
contrary to the 2003 land code provisions. More transparency and firmer as well as 
more practical legislation would likely stimulate land rentals and thus lead to further ef-
ficiency gains in the medium term. 
3.2  Agricultural policy environment 
During the 1990s, the Kazakh government engaged in the privatisation policies de-
scribed in the previous section but otherwise mostly neglected the agricultural sector 
(Pomfret, 2008, 227-238). However, when oil revenues became stable, agriculture was 
rediscovered as a strategic sector for making the Kazakh economy more competitive 
and diversified. According to Kazakh observers, the governments’ objectives were to 
substitute food imports by domestic products, thus ensuring national “food security”, 
and increasingly export agricultural staples but also processed food products (Wandel, 
2010, 17). To achieve these aims, increasing amounts of government expenditure were 
channelled through an emerging system of government agencies set up in support of the 
agricultural sector. On average, the annual growth of the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
budget in real terms between 2002 and 2008 was 17 percent (World Bank 2010, 10). 
The most important forms of support for farmers in this system have become credit pro-
grammes and a ramified system of area as well as output-oriented subsidies (see Figure 
9 and the review in World Bank, 2010, 13-17). However, budget priorities were chang-
ing during the recent decade. One such shift occurred from direct market interventions 
(mostly in grain markets) to production-oriented subsidy payments based on area use, 
production levels and input use. In general, crop production has received more support 
than livestock production. The trade regime in wheat was not particularly protectionist 
in the 2000s, although attempts to quantify the (absence of) distortions proved difficult 
(Pomfret 2008). During the price hike in spring 2008, Kazakhstan had introduced a 
temporary export ban for wheat (Lillis 2008), but has since declared to maintain an open 
export regime (Box 1).   21 




















Source: World Bank (2010, 17), based on official sources. 
In recent years, almost half of the Ministry’s expenditure was channelled through the 
state-owned holding KazAgro and its subsidiaries, and almost a quarter via local gov-
ernments (World Bank, 2010, 11). Local governments handle the distribution of produc-
tion-oriented subsidies. The main task of KazAgro is to implement government plans 
for the sustainable development of the agro-industrial complex. These include the direc-
tion of investments into sectors of special importance, the development of the infra-
structure, regulation and stabilisation of domestic agricultural markets, assistance with 
the formation of business clusters, and the implementation of the February 2007 “30 
Corporate Leaders” programme in the agricultural and food sector. It unites seven state 
institutions – all of which are legally joint stock companies – which hitherto operated 
directly under the Minister of Agriculture (Figure 10). 






















Source: Gramzow and Suleimenov (2011). 22 
KazAgro is thus an instrument of state economic and agricultural policy, i.e. a sort of a 
state agency for economic development.
6 Copying models from Singapore (“Temasek”) 
and Malaysia (“Khazanah”), the Kazakhstan government established two other, similar 
state holdings: the Sovereign Wealth Fund “Samruck-Kazyna” JSC, and “Samgau” (Na-
tional Scientific and Technological Holding JSC). The supposed task of all national 
holdings is to consolidate various state and semi-state enterprises and development in-
stitutions, so as to improve management and coordination between them, as well as 
stimulate larger investment in infrastructure and in so-called “priority sectors”. The es-
tablishment of these state holdings is part of the diversification policy that has been 
pushed forward since 2003, in order to counteract the predominance of raw materials in 
the Kazakh economy. This policy promotes the classification of those economic sectors 
thought to be particularly important and competitive, as set out by an action programme 
of 2004 providing for the development of “clusters”. Such clusters are regional concen-
trations of businesses that belong to the same or closely related sectors. These priority 
sectors include the agricultural and food sector as well as high technology. KazAgro is 
responsible for implementing the development strategy in the agricultural and food 
economy, and Samgau in the high-tech sector. Samruck-Kazyna was founded in 2008 
by a merger of the Kazakhstan Holding Company for the Management of State Assets 
“Samruck” and the “Kazyna” Sustainable Development Fund. The key purpose of 
“Samruk-Kazyna” is to manage the shares of national development institutions, national 
companies (e.g. KazMunaiGas, Kaztelekom, Air Astana) and other legal entities it owns 
to maximize their long-term value and competitiveness in the world markets. 
Usually, KazAgro is funded from general tax receipts of the government. However, in 
exceptional circumstances, funding is also directly coming from the National Welfare 
Fund, which accumulates the state income from oil sales. This happened during the fi-
nancial crisis, when extra liquidity was provided to KazAgro in order to prevent exces-
sive defaults (see Box 1), and in 2011, when a special programme for promoting in-
vestments in livestock was offered.  
Critics see KazAgro and the other state holdings as just another bureaucratic institution 
which is taking over tasks that ought to be the work of the ministries, meaning that 
overlaps are unavoidable. There is also scepticism as to whether an unbundling of eco-
nomic and political interests can be possible. On the one hand, the national holdings are 
supposed to implement economic policy, yet on the other they must operate efficiently 
like private enterprises and increase the business value of their daughter companies. 
This latter objective may be one of the reasons why independent businessmen and aca-
demics from both Kazakhstan and abroad have been appointed to the boards alongside 
government representatives. 
The roles of the individual KazAgro branches are as follows. The Food Contract Corpo-
ration acts as a procurement agency of the government that buys grain at the farm gate 
and runs state-owned storage facilities in order to ensure national food security. Pro-
curement prices used to be much below market prices, though (Gramzow and 
Suleimenov, 2011). Even so, the Food Contract Corporation accounts for almost half 
the budget of KazAgro. KazAgroFinance is primarily involved in leasing arrangements 
to provide farmers with access to machinery and livestock at favourable terms. It uses 
almost a quarter of the KazAgro budget. 
                                                 
6   It is not a private agroholding of the sort described in section 4.3.   23 
The Agrarian Credit Corporation (AKK) is the key government agency that provides 
farmers with subsidised credit (cf. Gramzow and Suleimenov, 2011, 11). To this end, it 
is linked to a network of 150 so-called Rural Credit Partnerships. These partnerships 
consist of 30 to 40 farms whose managers have to make a deposit in order to become 
members and thus eligible for funding. Based on available farm collateral, farmers sub-
mit their credit proposals via the Credit Partnerships to the AKK. If the proposal is ac-
cepted, the AKK grants a credit at a subsidised rate (recently four percent, compared to 
13 to 16 percent for commercial loans) to the Credit Partnership. The latter hands this 
credit over to the farmer at double the rate (hence, eight percent). Unlike traditional 
credit cooperatives in other countries, the Credit Partnerships have no autonomy in de-
cision making (Gaisina, 2007). They are not allowed to take regular savings and have no 
control over the deposits made by farmers. Only registered enterprises (including indi-
vidual farms), but no private individuals can become members. Rural Credit Partner-
ships are simply the local branch of a centralised governmental subsidy programme. 
Recently, default rates have been high. In another programme, the AKK provides spe-
cific credit lines for livestock purchases. AKK expenses account for a little more than 
20 percent of KazAgro’s budget (Gramzow and Suleimenov, 2011, 12). 
In terms of expenditure share, the remaining KazAgro subsidiaries are of secondary im-
portance. KazAgroGarant provides credit guarantees to agricultural enterprises. Kaz-
AgroMarketing is engaged in market information services and international promotion 
activities for Kazakh agricultural products. KazAgroProduct (the Stock Raising Prod-
ucts Corporation) has set up and runs slaughterhouses, feedlots and state dairy farms. 
The Fund for Financial Support in Agriculture was created as a microfinance agency for 
small farms and non-agricultural businesses. 
Box 5:  Credit access for individual farmers 
Yevgeni, the owner of “Niva” vegetable farm, has used commercial credit in the past and is a member of 
a governmentally sponsored Rural Credit Partnership. The Credit Partnership is operating at the rayon 
level and has 24 members. It was founded due to a government initiative in 2004. Each member had to 
deposit one million KZT as a share. The farmer recently took a loan for one year worth 10.5 million KZT, 
using his residential house as collateral. The interest rate is eight percent. In addition, the farmer has a 
credit line with the Credit Partnership. Commercial bank loans are also available, but are more expensive. 
The farmer recently took one seasonal loan for one million KZT, at a rate of 13 percent interest. His wife, 
a public servant, acted as a loan guarantor with her salary. Given additional fees and transaction costs, the 
total rate amounted to 18 percent. Occasionally, the farmer also had borrowed money from friends and 
relatives. 
“Beloe Osero” individual farm recently bought two combine harvesters for which a 16 million KZT credit 
was taken from the Rural Credit Partnership. The interest was nine percent and the loan was taken for five 
years. To become a member of the Partnership, the farmer had to make a deposit of 1.2 million KZT. The 
coop took machinery and his land as collateral.   
For “Saratomar” individual farm and bakery, access to credit appears to be a minor problem. According 
to the manager, banks used machinery as collateral in the past. Furthermore, a good repayment history is 
important. He never used land as collateral. 
Source: Case studies 4, 5 and 6, appendix. 
Casual evidence based on field visits suggests that many farmers, including individual 
ones, have taken advantage of the subsidised funding facilities provided by the govern-
ment, although commercial bank loans are also used (Box 5). Obtaining cheap credit 
from KazAgro is reported to be cumbersome and bureaucratic, so that private banks 24 
may have a competitive advantage in being more consumer-friendly. However, accord-
ing to Gramzow and Suleimenov (2011, 10), high default rates and the increasing en-
gagement of KazAgro have crowded commercial banks out of the agricultural lending 
business recently. The share of agriculture in nationwide commercial lending fell from 
12 percent in 2003 to under four percent in 2010. In late 2007 and 2008, commercial 
lending to the agricultural sector in Kazakhstan had strongly contracted due to the un-
folding global financial crisis (Box 1). 
Picture 4:  Individual farm fuel storage 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011. 
After an initial phase of neglect, the Kazakh government has increased agricultural pol-
icy spending to a significant extent. Much of this spending is channelled through a cen-
tralised and governmentally controlled system of payment agencies. In this system, 
market forces and autonomously operating, intermediating institutions play a minor 
role. Private lenders have even lost interest in the otherwise growing agricultural sector. 
Furthermore, many of the production-oriented policy measures will become difficult to 
sustain in the pending negotiations about Kazakhstan’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).  
4  The emerging farm structure 
4.1  Empirical patterns of farm restructuring 
The overall picture of farm dynamics in the last five years has been one of declining 
farm numbers but increasing farm sizes, both for the corporate and the individual sector. 
Compared to the initial situation at the cessation of the Soviet Union, the number of in-
corporated farms had gone up from 1300 state farms to about 1700 agricultural enter-
prises in the early 2000s (Figure 11). At the same time, the average size decreased con-
siderably, from more than 14,000 ha to about 10,000 ha (Figure 12). Total land under 
cultivation by agricultural enterprises fell from more than 18 million ha to less than 16 
million in the early 2000s (Figure 13). However, land use by agricultural enterprises in 
the NKGR picked up again in 2001. In the last decade, numbers of agricultural enter-
prises fluctuated, but they have stabilised at almost 1,800 since 2005. In this period, 
their average size has been growing to above 10,000 ha. 












1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agricultural enterprises active Individual farms active
Agricultural enterprises registered Individual farms registered  
Sources:  Number of active farms: 1990: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 2003, 111-112; 2000-2004: 
Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 133, 139; 
2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2005-2009, 
31. Number of registered farms: 2000-2005: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 
2005, 280; 2006-2007: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 256; 2008-2009: 
Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 249; Individual farms 2000: Statistical 
Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan 1996-99, 257. 
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1990 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agricultural enterprises Individual farms  
Sources:  Authors’ calculations based on Figure 11 (active farms) and 2000-2004: Statistical Yearbook of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 133, 139, 146; 2005-2009: Statisti-
cal Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2005-2009, 58, 67. Land use 
for 1990 is from Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture 2003, 120, and is cropland area only. 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Agricultural enterprises Individual farms Household economies  
Notes:  Data for agricultural enterprises and individual farms is all types of land, household economies is 
sown area (barely visible). 
Sources:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2000-2004: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 133, 139, 146; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2005-2009, 58, 67.   27 
The number of individual farms increased quickly by the end of the 1990s, probably as 
a by-product of bankruptcy proceedings applied to agricultural enterprises. How many 
were actually established is not so easy to say, as only formal registration without actual 
operations as well as swift failures seemed to be widespread. The Kazakh Statistical 
Agency states that about 10,000 farms were active by 2000, while the number of regis-
tered individual farms was about 50 percent higher (Figure 11). The number of regis-
tered and active farms converged in the last few years, probably also as a result of the 
nationwide agricultural census conducted in 2006/7. The number of active individual 
farms further increased until the mid of the decade, but then came under pressure and 
currently stands at about 12,000 farms. With slight fluctuations, average individual farm 
sizes are now above 500 ha, and have been growing since 2005 (Figure 12). 
Implementation of the land code in 2005 apparently led to a boost in farm creation, al-
beit a transitory one. Implementation went along with an all-time high in the number of 
active individual farms. The number of agricultural enterprises also went up. While the 
latter is consistent with a successful “merging small farms campaign”, the former is 
more difficult to reconcile with it. Many farmers seemed to still regard individual farms 
as a viable option. The average size of agricultural enterprises fell substantially in 2005, 
which means that the newly created enterprises were smaller than the average corporate 
farm before the implementation of the land code. 
Figure 14:  Number of agricultural enterprises registered in different organisa-








2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
State farms Limited partnerships (tovarishchestva)
Joint stock companies Producer cooperatives
Other forms  
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on: 2000-2005: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
280; 2006-2007: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 256; 2008-2009: Statisti-
cal Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 249. 
Figure 14 illustrates the notable rise in the number of registered agricultural enterprises 
in 2005, but also shows that this was only a transitory effect. The overall trend is a 
slight decline in the number of farms and, after 2005, a growing farm size, thus a con-
tinuing process of concentration. The figure also demonstrates that the limited partner-
ship has become the dominant form among the agricultural enterprises and that producer 28 
cooperatives as well as joint stock companies have become almost irrelevant in recent 
years. 
These reform steps notwithstanding, there has been a consistent pattern of growth in 
land area controlled by agricultural enterprises over the last decade. They continue to 
cultivate around three quarters of the agricultural land used in the NKGR, and land use 
vis-à-vis individual farms tends to grow in both absolute and relative terms (Figure 
13).
7  
Box 6:  The origin of farmers 
The individual farm “Niva” was established in 1997 by the current owner Yevgeni, who is a former con-
struction engineer. He started farming because his parents had a relation to it and he grew up in a village. 
Now he owns about 538 ha. His wife works as a public servant in the capital. Yevgeni has an Uzbek part-
ner, a former irrigation engineer for vegetables from Tashkent. Yevgeni is a member of the Republican 
public union “Union of Farmers of Kazakhstan” which represents the individual farms, the so-called 
“fermers” of Kazakhstan (6000 members, founded in 2001). 
Murat operates a sheep herd of 250 heads, producing meat and selling live animals for breeding purposes 
to other producers. Previous to his farming business, he was a building engineer in a corporate farm. 
Since 2003, when he started the operation, he has rented 400 ha of pasture in 49-year lease from the gov-
ernment. 
“Rodina” farm emerged from a former dairy sovkhoz, which hosted about 2,000 cows. It had severe eco-
nomic difficulties before the current fifty-year old director took over the operations. He is well known in 
the region for his entrepreneurial attitude and his social engagement for the local community. He is re-
spected for having an eye on local employment creation, which is why the two villages located adjacent 
to the farm had become attractive for in-migrants from other places of Kazakhstan. 
Source: Case studies 2, 5, 7, appendix. 
Picture 5:  Individual farmer in front of his tractors 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011. 
                                                 
7   Note that these figures give an idea of land that is potentially usable by farms. It includes pasture land 
and may include land that lies temporarily fallow.   29 
Despite an apparent preference of policymakers in favour of agricultural enterprises, a 
significant stratum of individual farms emerged in addition to the corporate sector. 
Many of the new managers apparently had leading positions in agriculture before and 
often have a technical education (Box 6).  
Figure 15:  Contribution of different farm types to Gross Agricultural Output, 









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Agricultural enterprises Individual farms Household economies  
Sources:  Authors’ calculations based on Statistical Bulletin Value of Agricultural Production, various is-
sues, deflated by agricultural sales price index published at www.stat.kz. 
Growing land use by agricultural enterprises is reflected in a growing share in gross ag-
ricultural output (GAO) (Figure 15). In addition to agricultural enterprises and individ-
ual farms, household economies contribute about 40 percent of GAO in the NKGR. 
This share is considerable, but lower than in other Central Asian countries (cf. Lerman 
2010, 103). Important outputs of household economies in the NKGR are livestock 
products (milk, meat) as well as labour-intensive field crops such as potatoes and vege-
tables. These high-value crops are produced on a minimal share of land, which covers 
about 60 thousand ha and is barely visible in Figure 13. Box 7 shows that household 
farms supply products that are increasingly in demand, such as milk consumed by urban 
residents.  
Box 7:  Surplus production by rural households 
There are many household farms (household plots) in Beloe Osero. They own two or three cows which 
are milked by hand. Because in the NKGR fresh milk is currently in short supply, the regional dairy com-
pany from Shortandy (50 km distance) is coming to the village on a daily basis and collects the milk. Dur-
ing summer, the cows are grazing on public pastures, which can be used for free. Additional concentrate 
is bought. 
Source: Case study 8, appendix. 
Figure 15 also demonstrates that unfavourable weather conditions such as in 2010 can 
still have profound effects on overall sector output. Particularly the producers of rainfed 30 
grain, i.e. the agricultural enterprises and the individual farms, experienced a notably 
reduced harvest caused by drought (see also Box 1).  
As the previous discussion showed, there was little change in formal ownership of land, 
but substantial changes in the management of farmland did take place in the NKGR. 
Former state and collective farms were transformed into restructured corporate enter-
prises. With practically no role for land markets in the conventional sense, these 
changes were strongly mediated by government legislation in the form of privatization 
and bankruptcy procedures. On top of the uncertainty about land tenure security, asym-
metries in access to information, management experience, financial resources and thus 
power likely played a major role in the restructuring process. These circumstances also 
opened the door for outside investors to become active in the NKGR. There can be no 
doubt, however, that there were many individual entrepreneurs who opted to create new 
independent, individual farms, and thus accepted the challenge to set up this alternative 
to the established type of corporate farming organisation. 
4.2  Performance of different farm types 
The viability and relative performance of individual farms under conditions of post-
Soviet agriculture has been a controversial issue among academics and international 
policy advisors. Many analysts used to be convinced that – compared to corporate farms 
and following the model of most Western economies – individual family farms repre-
sented the more efficient and also more equitable mode of production.
8 However, the 
emergence of individual farms has been much below expectations in land-rich Russia 
and Ukraine (Lerman et al., 2004). To the contrary, in North Kazakhstan, farm restruc-
turing has led to a more balanced land use by both individual and corporate farm types 
than in other post-Soviet countries (Figure 13). Throughout the NKGR, individual farms 
and agricultural enterprises are directly competing for land.  
By international standards, farm sizes in terms of land used by individual farms in the 
NKGR are very large. This raises a question about the real differences between the two 
farm types. Such differences seem to be most pronounced in legal, but also in ideologi-
cal respects. With regard to management, differences appear only gradual. First, under 
Kazakh law, individual farms have a simpler registration procedure and a simpler and 
lower tax burden than agricultural enterprises (Box 3; USAID 2005, 19). Owners must 
be members of the same (extended) family. Although many of them are actually in-
volved in significant commercial activities, individual farms are regarded as non-
commercial farms and are not subject to enterprise legislation.
9 Second, there is evi-
dence that maintaining agricultural enterprises was the preferred option by many gov-
ernment officials during the bankruptcy procedures of the late 1990s (Gray 2000, 15), 
and it was most explicit in the “merging small farms campaign” during the 2003 land 
                                                 
8   For some of the analytical underpinnings of this view see Binswanger et al. (1995) and Tomich et al. 
(1995). A key argument has been that family farms are more productive because labour shirking is 
mitigated by family ties. Lerman (2010) shows that Kazakh regions with more individual farms also 
display a higher land productivity, which he attributes to a general superiority of individual farms. The 
relevance of the Western farming model for the post-socialist countries has recently been called into 
question by Wandel et al. (2011). 
9   As noted above, simple partnerships have emerged as a second type of natural person farm organisa-
tion, which also allows ownership by non-family members, but shares most other properties of indi-
vidual farms.   31 
code implementation (section 3.1; USAID 2005, 23). Among (local) policymakers, such 
as the municipal and district mayors (akims), individual farms seem to have a persistent 
image of smallness and otherness. Municipal and district mayors are the local represen-
tatives of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In the minds of these officials, 
this seems to imply unproductiveness and backwardness, and results in a political pref-
erence for larger, incorporate farms. It is of course possible that the lower tax revenues 
from individual farms are a reason why government officials prefer more regulated and 
higher taxed enterprises. However, informal mindsets still based on socialist production 
ideals may play a role as well (Koester and Petrick, 2010). 
On the other hand, statistical figures and case study results (see appendix) suggest that 
in the NKGR, production portfolios, technologies and natural conditions are mostly 
identical for both types of farms. From a managerial standpoint, most individual farms 
seem to be simply smaller agricultural enterprises. They also depend on hired labour 
and face similar incentive problems with regard to labour supervision. As the case stud-
ies show, land is often rented from the government and at least some of the individual 
farmers do have access to governmentally sponsored credit facilities and other subsi-
dies. Even so, capital intensity is likely to be lower than in agricultural enterprises, and 
machinery use more often based on dated Soviet technology (see Box 2). If the govern-
ment is not showing enthusiasm for this type of farming, it at least tolerates it, recog-
nises it as a now important part of Kazakh agriculture, and grants significant tax bene-
fits. These in turn provide an economic incentive to practice farming as an individual 
farmer and not as an agricultural enterprise subject to full bookkeeping and taxation ob-
ligations. 
Box 8:  Labour supervision and management in different farm types 
The “Enbek Bereke” corporate grain farm uses a full GPS-based monitoring system, including track con-
trol of the tractor. Data from the tractors is transferred via memory sticks. In 2011, workers will for the 
first time obtain performance pay based on GPS imaging. The agronomist says it is difficult to find work-
ers for simple tasks such as grain shovelling in winter, while workers are more willing to engage in better 
paid and more responsible jobs such as tractor driving. 
In the “Rodina” dairy corporation, workers in the milking complex obtain a monthly base salary, which is 
topped up if quantity and quality targets are exceeded. This regime applies for dairymen and workers in-
volved in feeding. 
“Saratomar”, an individual wheat farm, also operates a system of performance pay for the tractorists. For 
sowing, they obtain a base payment depending on the area they drilled. The work is assessed after germi-
nation and the pay is doubled if all seedlings have appeared on the surface. Additional top-ups are granted 
after the harvest. In winter, the workers do subsidiary work in the farm-bakery enterprise, but they do not 
get unemployed. A main problem of the farm is to find reliable and qualified workers. 
The individual vegetable farm “Niva” employs six permanent workers on the farm, plus about 50 sea-
sonal workers. Workers are paid according to the overall performance of the farm. They obtain a monthly 
base salary, the overall payment is then assessed at the end of the season. There is a seasonal production 
target. If this is achieved, the salary is doubled. The seasonal workers are contracted for a period of seven 
months. The farmer employs a group of seasonal workers from Uzbekistan who come regularly every 
year, some for five years in a row, others already for eight years. They live in small cabins on the farm.    
Source: Case studies 1, 2, 4, 5, appendix. 
Many farmers interviewed in the case studies – both from enterprises and individual 
farms – were concerned about future access to qualified labour. A vocational training of 
agricultural workers does not exist and also college education for management staff ap-32 
pears to be still widely production-oriented and with little focus on business manage-
ment. In addition, labour supervision and the design of incentive-compatible employ-
ment contracts are persistent issues for many managers (Box 8). In this management 
field, little systematic knowledge is available about actual practice and possible options, 
including new technologies. Which mechanisms drove recent increases in nominal 
wages is also largely unknown, but should be seen in relation to this issue.  
The NKGR represents a unique case in which competition among the two types of farm-
ing organisations can be studied on a more level playing field than in other post-Soviet 
countries. We use three aggregate indicators to measure the relative competitiveness of 
individual farms versus agricultural enterprises: the growth in land use over time as well 
as the GAO per ha and the wheat yields per ha as measures of productivity. Finally, we 
present figures on the profitability of grain production in agricultural enterprises. 
Figure 16 shows that, during recent years, agricultural enterprises have been expanding 
their land use mostly at a higher rate and more persistently than individual farms (see 
also Figure 13 and Box 9). Even so, GAO per ha is very similar for both organisational 
forms (Figure 17). Both groups have experienced productivity growth recently, and the 
ranking in terms of GAO per ha has changed several times since 2004. Wheat yields, 
however, have consistently been higher for individual farms, although the gap between 
both groups has narrowed in past years (Figure 18). 
Box 9:  Land access for individual farmers 
“Saratomar” individual farm is family owned and cultivates 650 ha of wheat. The land was rented from 
the government in 1997 as a 49-year leasehold. Until 1990, it had been cultivated by a kolkhoz, after that 
by a corporate farm which went bankrupt. The current owner had no relation to this corporate farm. The 
agronomist states that several individual farms created in the 1990s did not survive. Land expansion is 
difficult, as there is little supply. Occasionally a farm goes bankrupt, then the land is quickly distributed 
among neighbouring farms. 
The individual farm “Niva” was established in 1997 by the owner who first rented land as a 49-year 
leasehold from the government. He later bought land under the new ownership legislation of 2003. The 
price for pastures was 28 thousand KZT/ha (190 USD/ha), the price for arable land 44 thousand KZT/ha 
(300 USD/ha). The land was formerly cultivated by a sovkhoz, from which his father and other family 
members had obtained shares in the privatisation process. Now he owns about 538 ha, of which 238 ha 
are pastures. 
“Beloe Osero” farm was founded in 1998 upon the remnants of a bankrupt kolkhoz. The farm cultivates 
2,000 ha in total, of which 1,300 ha were taken over from former inhabitants of the village. These were 
ethnic Germans who left the village and sold their use-rights to the current farmer. An additional 700 ha 
were rented for 49 years from the government. The total land divides into 1200 ha of arable land and 800 
ha of pastures. On the arable land, 1000 ha of wheat are grown and 200 ha of barley. 
Murat has rented 400 ha of pasture in 49-year lease from the government. There is no rent to be paid, only 
taxes. He is currently planning to expand his farm by renting another 100 ha from the government. In this 
course he intends to apply for government support with the help of the state-operated KazAgroMarketing 
office in Astana. 
Nationwide, rental rates for state land vary between 0.70 and 2.70 USD per ha and year (Gramzow and 
Suleimenov 2011, 16). 
Source: Case studies 4, 5, 6, 7, appendix.   33 
Figure 16:  Annual change of total land used by farm types in North Kazakh 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Figure 13. 
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Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Figure 13 and Figure 15. 34 
Figure 18:  Wheat yields in different farm types, North Kazakh Grain Region 









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Agricultural enterprises Individual farms  
Sources:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2000-2004: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 149, 190; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2005-2009, 69, 106. 
According to the agricultural enterprise survey of the Kazakh Statistical Agency, grain 
production in these enterprises has been profitable during the entire decade (Figure 19). 
In the wake of the price boom of 2007/2008, profit margins have increased substan-
tially. The evidence put forward by Dudwick et al. (2007) in favour of more thorough 
farm restructuring – that corporate farms are largely unprofitable in the NKGR – is thus 
not supported by this data. Unfortunately, no comparable figures are available for indi-
vidual farms. 
Concerning the relative economic superiority of individual versus corporate farms in the 
NKGR, the evidence is mixed. Productivity figures are very close. Whereas agricultural 
enterprises continue to use more land and contribute more to GAO, crop-specific land 
productivity is slightly higher in individual farms. Both types of farms increased land 
use and land productivity over time, and thus contributed to agricultural recovery in the 
NKGR.    35 
Figure 19:  Cost and revenue of grain production in agricultural enterprises, 







2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Production cost of grain in ag enterprises Grain revenue  
Notes:  Calculations are based on average farm-level figures published by the Kazakh Statistical 
Agency. Cost of production is the sum of the actual costs directly related to the production and 
sale of crops, i.e. material costs, labour costs, with deductions, including payments in kind, de-
preciation, tax payments, other costs (Methodological note in Statistical Bulletin The Activity of 
Agricultural Enterprises 2009). Over the years, pulses and grain maize are sometimes included 
and sometimes not, although their quantitative importance relative to spring wheat is negligible 
in the NKGR. 
Sources:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2000-2004: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-2004, 127, 147, 188; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2005-2009, 53, 89, 105; Statistical Bulletin The Activ-
ity of Agricultural Enterprises in 2009. Average annual KZT/USD exchange rate as published at 
www.stat.kz. 
A factor that is hard to capture by statistical figures is the apparently increasing influ-
ence of external investors in Kazakh grain production. Following the post-1998 model 
of Russian agriculture (Rylko et al. 2008; Wandel 2011), such agroholdings are said to 
control huge tracts of land and integrate several stages of the production process also in 
the NKGR. We turn to their role next. 
4.3  The role of agroholdings 
There are no official data which might permit reliable conclusions to be made about the 
significance of agroholdings in Kazakhstan’s agricultural and food economy, or in indi-
vidual sectors. For this reason only some initial, provisional answers are possible, based 
on individual case studies and the testimonies of experts. 
The lack of statistical information might be an indication that agroholdings are far less 
widespread in Kazakhstan than in neighbouring Russia. Discussions with Kazakh agri-
cultural economists have in fact largely confirmed this suspicion. These conversations 
have also flagged up practical difficulties in data acquisition, not least because of the 
fact that “agroholding” is not an officially recognised enterprise or legal form (cf. Irbaev 
and Frangulidi, 2006). First, “agroholdings” do not appear publicly as consolidated 
groups of enterprises. It is therefore almost impossible for the outside observer to find 
out whether individual businesses belong to a holding or not. Second, there is no una-36 
nimity over how to distinguish “agroholdings” from other forms of integration. For ex-
ample, so-called “agrofirms” also integrate several (not infrequently all) members of the 
entire vertical value chain, but without the company structure taking the form of a hold-
ing. It is more the case that the individual stages become departments of a single, amal-
gamated enterprise, thereby losing their economic and legal independence. Examples of 
this are “Agrofirma Bereke” or the public company AO APK “Adal” in the Almaty 
oblast, which are involved with fruits and vegetables, and milk production respectively. 
Even if the existence of a parent company is seen as a sign of an agroholding, it still re-
mains unclear whether the concept “agroholdings” should be restricted to those groups 
of businesses that are working strictly in agricultural production, or also include those 
that are only active in the upstream or downstream sectors. Examples of the latter can be 
found in the dairy industry. Thus the limited liability company (TOO) “Agroprodukt”, 
the Kazakh–Israeli joint venture (SP) “Camoni”, and the largest producer of dairy prod-
ucts in Kazakhstan, the joint stock company AO “Food Master”, only operate in the 
processing and retail sectors. In this context, Akimbekova (2006) refers in some places 
to “integrated structures” and in others to “agroholdings”. 
In spite of these problems of definition and differentiation, initial studies by Kazakh 
analysts suggest that integrated groups of enterprises are chiefly to be found in the grain 
sector, and to a lesser extent in the oilseed and dairy sectors (Irbaev and Franguldi, 
2006). Akimbekova (2006) estimated the number of agroholdings in the grain sector to 
be around 40. They are reckoned to control about 30% of farmland devoted to grains, 
and provide two thirds of the grains sold both domestically and abroad. Oshakbayev 
(2010) states that each of the three largest holdings in the NKGR controls more than 
700 thousand ha, and that the 15 largest holdings cultivate 35 percent of total sown area 
in the NKGR. 
Box 10:  “Ivolga-Holding”, an agroholding originating in the NKGR 
The “Ivolga-Holding” was established by one individual, the former sovkhoz director Vasiliy Rozinov, 
who remained the sole owner of the group up to date. He earned the starting capital for the subsequent 
expansion by trading in grain in the early 1990s. Rozinov recognised very early on that more money can 
be made in grain trading if you have your own storage facilities, because these enable you to react better 
to price changes. He therefore bought a grain elevator in Kostanay, followed by others. When coordina-
tion difficulties with agricultural producers started mounting up soon afterwards and grain deliveries be-
came less and less reliable, Rozinov entered grain farming himself. He bought up debt-ridden agricultural 
businesses. The management then discovered further potential for profit in flour and compound feed pro-
duction, and expanded the business into the upstream sector. In 2005, the agroholding started to diversify 
by entering into Russian sugar and milk production. According to Rozinov, however, this move was more 
a result of accident than a long-term business strategy. In 2005, the Kazakh bank “TuranAlem”, which 
also has branches in Russia, offered Ivolga as one of its regular clients three sugar factories in Kursk 
oblast, which were unable to settle their debts. “Ivolga” accepted the offer and also immediately bought 
up nearby sugar producers so as to guarantee the utilisation of the sugar factories. In 2007, “Ivolga-
Holding” controlled around one million hectares of agricultural land in Kazakhstan, and a further 40,000 
ha in Russia. 
Sources: Irbaev and Frangulidi (2006); Osipov (2007). 
Irbaev and Frangulidi (2006) make the distinction between large and small agroholdings 
in the Kazakh grain sector, which exist almost exclusively in the NKGR. According to 
their research, there are about 15 “big players”. These include such enterprises as 
“Ivolga Holding”, “Alibi”, “Grain Industry” (Zernovaya industriya), “Agrocentr Astan”, 
“BATT-Grain”, “Bogvi”, “Cesna Astyk” and “Karasu”. Most of these have their origins   37 
in grain trade, and have gradually integrated themselves into the upstream sectors of 
grain processing and production. Some of these large agroholdings themselves are part 
of business conglomerates which are particularly prevalent in the Kazakh oil, gas, min-
ing and finance industries (see Table 2). “BATT-Grain”, for example, belongs to the 
“BATT Group”, which operates in the oil, gas, construction, trade and alcohol sectors. 
“Cesna-Astyk” TOO belongs to the investment group “Cesna” which began life back in 
1988. It operates in construction and finance, wholesale and retail, as well as in the agri-
cultural and food sector. It began operations in the last of these back in 1992 with the 
purchase of a grain elevator in Akmola oblast. Since then the enterprise has expanded 
its activity to encompass grain farming and the production of compound feed, flour, 
bread, pasta and beer. 
The development of the larger known agroholdings in the grain sector has progressed 
along similar lines. This is well illustrated by the example of the “Ivolga-Holding” (Box 
10).  
Table 2:   Characteristics of selected grain holdings 
Company Year 
founded 






stakes in the oil and 
gas sectors, construc-
tion and sales 
Farming and processing 
of grain to make com-
pound feed, flour and 
bread products, and sales 
operations. From 2007 
operations restricted to 
drinks production. 
Up to 2006: no 
figures 
Since 2006: 0 ha 
TOO “Cesna-
Astyk” 
1992 Investment  company 
“Cesna” (diversified 
group with stakes in 
the finance, construc-
tion and media sec-
tors) 
Production and process-
ing of grain to make 
flour, bread and pasta 
products, wholesale and 
retail sales, beer produc-
tion. 
40,000 ha 
“Ivolga-Holding” 1992  Vasiliy  Rozinov  (en-
trepreneur from grain 
trade)  
Production, processing 
and sale of grain (flour, 
compound feed), sugar 
and raw milk production 
(in Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia). 
1 million ha in 
NKGR 




1996  Mill combine  Production and process-
ing of grain (flour, bread 
and pasta products) as 
well as sales; low-level 





2004 Compound  feed  busi-
ness 
Production and process-
ing of grain (compound 




 Source: Authors’ compilation based on Kazakh journal, newspaper, and internet sources. 38 
Other large agroholdings with a similar development pattern have diversified in oilseeds 
(e.g. “Maslodel” and “Vita Soy”) or have integrated forwards into other processing 
stages, such as bread and pasta production, and retail. Examples of the latter are “Cesna-
Astyk” and “Grain Industry” which, by comparison with “Ivolga-Holding”, farm only a 
modest 40,000 and 100,000 ha respectively. 
According to Irbaev and Frangulidi (2006), smaller holdings in the grain sector differ 
from large ones by the fact that they have a limited involvement in grain exports, and by 
their lower processing capacity. They usually control several agricultural enterprises, 
but do not own more than two large elevators and/or grain mills. Examples of this cate-
gory of agroholding are “TNK”, “KazAgroTrade”, “Kunaykhleprodukt” and “Ellnvest”. 
The last of these owns one elevator, a compound feed factory and four farms with a to-
tal area of 36,000 ha. Meanwhile, “Ellnvest” has gone further in its vertical integration 
by taking over the production and processing of poultry and pork. Table 2 summarises 
the main characteristics of selected grain holdings. 
In summary, there are clear indications that agroholdings are also active in the NKGR. 
However, which practical difference the engagement of an agroholding makes vis-à-vis 
more conventional types of farming, with regard to management, access to finance, pro-
ductivity for example, is largely unclear.  
5  Social impacts of agricultural recovery 
5.1  Regional employment and household welfare 
In general, population numbers have been stable over the last five years at 2.3 million 
people, implying a population density of 5.2 persons/km². However, the region lost 
about 30 percent of its population in the early 1990s.
10 This is against the overall Ka-
zakh trend, which has displayed population increases at a rate of some one to two per-
cent per year recently, so that pre-1990 figures are now almost reached again nation-
wide. Also the number of people living in rural areas of the NKGR has been without 
major change during the last decade (Figure 20).
11 
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North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan   
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2002-2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
61; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 77. 
The absolute number of persons employed in agriculture of the NKGR has been stable 
as well (Figure 20). However, the number of workers in agricultural enterprises fell be-
tween five and ten percent annually until 2004. More recent figures are not available.  
While the share of the economically active population employed in agriculture has con-
sistently declined from above 30 percent in 2001 to about 25 percent in 2009 for Ka-
zakhstan as a whole, this share also has stayed at around 40 percent for the NKGR 
(Figure 22). Agriculture thus continues to be a significant economic factor for employ-
ment in this region. 
                                                 
10   Many of these were ethnic Germans and Russians who decided to move to their initial home country 
in the mid-1990s. 
11   The jump in 2007 for Kazakhstan is probably due to a statistical re-classification. 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2001-2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
85; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 103. Workers in agricul-
tural enterprises: Statistical Yearbook of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery in Kazakhstan 2000-
2004, 108.  
Figure 22:  Share of economically active population employed in agriculture, 
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North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on 2001-2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
83, 85; 2005-2009: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 101, 103.  
The share of agriculture in regional GDP is lower than the share in employment, and has 
been falling from almost 35 percent for the NKGR to less than 25 percent in 2008   41 
(Figure 23). It has been rising, though, in 2009. A direct implication of these figures is 
that average labour productivity is lower in agriculture than in other sectors of the 
NKGR economy, and that this productivity gap has been increasing recently.
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North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan  
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2001-2003: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
203, 207; 2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 196, 200; 2005-2009: Sta-
tistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 191, 195.  
However, given the fact that nominal wages increased more than food prices, real wages 
and real incomes in rural areas have been rising notably (Figure 5, Figure 24). This is 
also reflected in the rise of real consumption spending per capita in rural households, 
which almost doubled between 2003 and 2009 (Figure 25). Note that the dip for 2009 in 
Figure 25 is a result of strong rise in the KZT/USD exchange rate in that year (see Box 
1). 
                                                 
12   A closer look at the composition of regional product shows that construction work has been expanding 
in recent years, probably due to the implementation of major transport infrastructure development in 
the region. 42 
Figure 24:  Consumption spending and cost of living for rural households in 


















Rural consumption spending NKGR Cost of living NKGR  
Notes:  Consumption spending is the sum of cash income used for consumption (not including savings 
and investments), the value of production for own consumption and transfers in kind (dokhody 
domashnikh khoziaistv). Production for own consumption is valued at average regional purchase 
prices (Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 110). Spending is weighted by 
population size for Akmola, Kostanay and North-Kazakhstan provinces. Cost of living index is 
simple average of provincial indices for these three provinces. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2003: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 116, 
421; 2004-2005: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 121, 397; 2006-2009: Sta-
tistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 123, 377. Spending estimations draw on repre-
sentative household surveys conducted quarterly by the Kazakh Statistical Agency.  
Figure 25:  Real monthly consumption expenditures by rural households (USD 








2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
North-Kazakh Grain Region Kazakhstan   
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on sources given for Figure 24 and average annual KZT/USD ex-
change rate as published at www.stat.kz.   43 
Along with rising household incomes, poverty indicators went down impressively over 
the recent decade. The Kazakh Statistical Agency calculates a regionally differentiated 
household subsistence income every year, which includes food and non-food items (Sta-
tistical Yearbook of the Regions 2009, 110). This normative subsistence income has 
been raised consistently over recent years. It is taken here as an absolute poverty line. 
Household income estimations are based on representative household surveys con-
ducted quarterly and include household production used for own consumption as well as 
in-kind transfers. While in the early 2000s almost every second household in the NKGR 
was considered poor, this figure dropped to five percent in 2010 (Figure 26). After some 
methodological modifications were introduced in 2006, the proportion of poor house-
holds is no longer published separately for urban and rural households. Figures based on 
the previous system available until 2005 indicate that rural poverty rates were in the 
range of one and a half to two times the urban rates. Poverty levels thus fell faster in ur-
ban areas of the NKGR. As one of the few statistics presented in this study, Figure 26 
makes a statement about the distributional rather than the average effects of agricultural 
recovery. 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations based on: 2001-2003: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2005, 
124; 2004: Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 129; 2005-2009: Statistical 
Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2009, 131.  
Given the available statistical information, rural areas in the NKGR have witnessed a 
remarkable rise in living standards over the recent decade. Most outstandingly, rural in-
habitants now spend twice as much in real terms on consumption than in 2003. Poverty 
rates plummeted from forty percent in 2002 to about five percent by 2010. There can 
hence be no doubt that, along with recovery of the farm sector, economic conditions for 
the majority of households in the NKGR have improved considerably over the recent 
decade. 44 
Picture 6:  Household plots with livestock 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011. 
5.2  Farm restructuring and poverty reduction: identifying the pathways 
Which were the main drivers of income increases in the NKGR? To give a tentative in-
sight into the relevant pathways, Figure 27 illustrates the main financial relationships 
relevant for rural households and agricultural producers in the NKGR. Agricultural en-
terprises’ main sources of revenue are grain sales to downstream industries and/or world 
grain markets. They benefit from capital, technology, and management brought by out-
side investors, and may be part of integrated business structures (agroholdings) which 
encompass several stages in the food chain. However, they rely on the local labour force 
and are an important player on local job markets. Agricultural enterprises pay dividends 
to rural households which contributed their land to the enterprises’ capital stock. Fur-
thermore, they make rental payments to the government, the only source of rental land. 
At the same time, they benefit from crop-related subsidy payments as well as invest-
ment aids the government has recently provided to an increasing extent (see section 
3.2). 
Individual farms have sales channels similar to the agricultural enterprises, except that 
the channels may be more diversified and may include direct sales to local or urban con-
sumers. Individual farms also seek workers in the rural labour market. In addition, they 
receive some of their services from agricultural enterprises or non-farm businesses, 
which are paid in cash or in kind. Many individual farms also rent land from the state. 
For individual farms, there are flat payments to the government, which satisfy land rent 
and land tax at the same time.   45 
Figure 27:  Financial flows in the rural economy of the NKGR 
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Source:  Authors.  
The main assets of rural households that do not operate an individual farm are their la-
bour force, the household plot, usually some livestock, and shares in arable land culti-
vated by agricultural enterprises. This allows them to receive income from the following 
sources: 
  Wage incomes from agricultural and non-agricultural employment; 
  Public pension transfers based on rights acquired from earlier employment; 
  Revenues from product sales, e.g. vegetables grown on the household plot and live-
stock products; while some of these products are directly sold to consumers, others 
are processed in downstream industries (e.g., milk); 
  Income from other entrepreneurial activity; 
  Dividends from land shares in agricultural enterprises. 
Unfortunately, no detailed information about the relative importance and dynamics of 
the different income channels of rural households is available. The only piece of evi-
dence we have is based on survey data collected by the World Bank in 2003 (Dudwick 
et al., 2007). Statements about income sources by 150 randomly chosen rural house-
holds in one of the NKGR provinces are summarised in Figure 28. It shows that in 
2003, about half of the household income came from salaries, while 20 percent came 
from pensions. Sales of self-produced food items account for at least 10 percent of 
household income, whereas additional five percent were also consumed by the house-
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agricultural enterprises or individual farms.
13 Incomes from non-agricultural businesses 
have a small share of three percent in total income. 
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Notes:  Answers to the question: What portion of the total household monthly income consists of the fol-
lowing items? (in percent). Numbers are mean percentages across households. N=150. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on World Bank survey 2003 (Dudwick et al., 2007).  
According to data from the Kazakh Statistical Agency, nominal wages in agriculture 
quadrupled since 2001 (Figure 5), while nominal pensions approximately doubled (see 
Statistical Yearbook Living Standards in Kazakhstan, 2010, 119). Recent wage in-
creases are thus likely a main driver of poverty reduction. Rural labour has become 
scarce, which implies increasing market power for workers compared to a situation of 
abundant rural labour. Some wage increases seemed to be due to off-farm employment, 
for example in the booming construction sector. This in turn is fuelled by large infra-
structure projects funded by the Kazakh government. Casual evidence from field obser-
vations suggests that demand for some of the household produce (such as milk) has also 
risen. Little is known about the responsiveness of dividend payments to improvements 
in the profitability of agricultural enterprises (Figure 19). 
An interesting question is whether rural households benefitted from the recent food 
price boom (Figure 5). A key issue to answer this question is whether households are 
net buyers or sellers of food (Aksoy and Hoekman, 2010). For households running an 
individual farm, it seems clear that they are net sellers, so that their incomes increase 
during price booms. With regard to rural households, we may use Figure 28 plus addi-
tional evidence to explore this question. Several sources of rural household income are 
directly or indirectly linked to food prices: the salaries from agricultural employment, 
the sales of food items, consumption of self-produced food, and in-kind payments, 
                                                 
13   Sublease of land to individual farms was still legal at the time of data collection.   47 
which are also likely often food items (e.g., grain). Added up, these items account for 47 
percent or almost half of the total household income. On the other hand, in 2003, the 
average household in Akmola spent 48 percent of cash consumption expenditure on 
food, almost the same number (Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 
125). However, as cash income is only a part of the total income reported in Figure 
28,
14 the share of food items on the income side is likely to be higher than on the ex-
penditure side. When food prices rise, rural household net welfare thus increases on av-
erage.
15  
Figure 27 and Box 11 also demonstrate the manifold interdependencies that exist among 
the three main types of agricultural producers, particularly in the area of service and in-
put provision. Traditionally, household economies used to benefit from inputs supplied 
by agricultural enterprises, such as feed or machinery services. It is unclear how impor-
tant these often informal input flows still are today. In addition, livestock production by 
households is partly based on access to public grazing land. There is clear evidence that 
many households produce a surplus to their subsistence needs which is looked after by, 
for example, urban consumers. But also individual farms appear to be dependent in 
some ways on the agricultural enterprises, even to the extent that the latter represent a 
type of service station for surrounding smaller producers. 
Box 11:  Interdependencies among farm types 
The Joint Stock Company “Petrovska” is operating on 25,000 ha and has machinery stations in surround-
ing villages, which also offer services for individual farmers and households. Half of “Petrovska’s” land 
still belongs to the villagers living nearby the farm. Several of the land owners also work on the farm. In-
dividual farmers in the villages around it regard it as quite competitive and seem unable to bid land out of 
it. The competition for workers is also very strong. 
Yevgeni, an individual farmer, regularly orders a railroad freight car with fertiliser together with a couple 
of neighbouring individual farms. Sometimes this has led to coordination problems in the past. 
The village “Beloe Osero” hosts an individual farm which occasionally borrows machinery from a nearby 
agricultural enterprise, for example a manure spreader. The farm also buys seed there. Many of the 
households in the village supply labour to the individual farm, while they also grow vegetables and raise 
livestock on their household plot. 
Source: Case studies 3, 5, 6, 7, appendix. 
                                                 
14   Cash consumption (potrebitel’skie raskhody naseleniia) here neither includes consumption of self-
produced food nor in-kind transfers. 
15   Household cash consumption spending in Akmola (not including the capital Astana) was 76,684 KZT 
in 2003 (Statistical Yearbook Regions of Kazakhstan in 2007, 125), whereas the rural households sur-
veyed in the World Bank 2003 study had a median annual income of 234,000 KZT. This is about three 
times the level reported in the official source. One reason for this difference may be that the World 
Bank respondents included incomes that were received in-kind and that non-cash expenditures are not 
considered in the official Kazakh source. However, it is unlikely that this can explain the entire gap. If 
the World Bank respondents were on average richer than the households surveyed by the Statistical 
Agency, it is likely that they spent a smaller share of their income on food items, so that the net bene-
fit from rising food prices was even higher. 48 
Picture 7:  Village road with household plots 
 
Photo by Martin Petrick 2011.  
6  Conclusions 
6.1  Summary of findings 
The evidence presented in this study documents a widely positive development of agri-
cultural production in the three major grain producing provinces of Kazakhstan. To-
gether with an expansion of cropland area and increasing capital input, real agricultural 
value added has almost doubled within a decade.  
While hesitant in the early transition period, privatisation legislation has more recently 
allowed private ownership of land and has put the basic preconditions for a capitalist 
mode of agricultural production into place. There are now three dominant groups of ag-
ricultural producers in the NKGR that emerged from the restructuring processes of the 
transition period. The first group consists of large agricultural enterprises in the form of 
limited liability partnerships, the second group of smaller individual farms, and the third 
of tiny household economies. Agricultural enterprises cultivate about 10,000 ha per 
farm on average and control almost three quarters of agricultural land in the NKGR. In-
dividual farms emerged as a new type of producer in the process of land privatisation 
and cultivate one quarter of the land, with an average farm size of around 560 ha. 
Household economies mostly engage in labour-intensive vegetable and livestock pro-
duction. In relation to the other two types of farming organisations, agricultural land use 
by the latter is minimal, but their share in agricultural output is about 40 percent.  
Compared to other post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan is distinct in having established a 
significant individual farm sector side-by-side with the reformed agricultural enterprises 
in its primary grain producing region. Interestingly, while agricultural enterprises have 
been growing more persistently than individual farms in recent years, average land pro-
ductivity is practically identical and wheat yields tend to be even higher in individual 
farms. Registration procedures for individual farms are simpler and tax obligations 
lower. However, among government officials, an ideological bias against this type of 
farming seems to prevail. Both vertically and horizontally integrated agroholdings have 
emerged among the agricultural enterprises and have brought outside investment and 
management to the region. While we document some of the agroholdings’ activities, 
which are chiefly in grain trade, they are generally little transparent and few substantive 
statements about their real impact in rural areas can be made. 
Government support to agriculture has been rising recently, and is based on a highly 
centralised system of area-, output-, and input-related subsidies. The government is also 
engaged in grain procurement and storage to achieve national food security goals, but 
does no longer interfere in on-farm production decisions. Subsidised funding for agri-
cultural investments is provided through the state-owned holding KazAgro. These sub-
sidies offer the agricultural sector access to the governments’ tax receipts and oil reve-
nues. However, the implementation system chosen gives little room for the type of de-
centralised market institutions which have advantages in information processing, are 
less prone to elite capture and have been instrumental for sustainable rural development 
49 50 
in other contexts.
16 Despite the still tremendous financing needs, private lenders have 
even turned away from the agricultural sector recently. 
These partly questionable government activities notwithstanding, agricultural recovery 
in the NKGR has brought clear and measurable benefits to the rural population. With 
stable employment in agriculture, consumption spending by rural households has tripled 
over the last decade and has risen much faster than the costs of living. Real monthly 
consumption expenditures by rural households doubled between 2003 and 2009, and are 
higher than in Kazakhstan on average. Poverty went down considerably, from 40 per-
cent of households below the regional poverty line in 2002 to about five percent in 
2010. Much of this positive development is likely due to rising food prices, which 
trickle down to rural households, and increasing labour scarcity in rural areas. 
6.2  Policy recommendations 
Given the new global debate about how to reconcile productivity growth in agriculture 
with social inclusion in rural areas, North Kazakhstan looks much like a success story. 
Even so, among the issues covered by this study, the following deserve attention by the 
Kazakh government: 
  Access to land and capital for agricultural producers continues to be constrained by 
strongly regulated and governmentally controlled allocation systems. While land 
sales are now possible in principle, such transactions require large capital invest-
ments and a long-term planning horizon. Both conditions are often not given, so that 
land sales remain few. For more immediate adjustments in land use, the develop-
ment of land rental markets is desirable. However, the legal provisions for such 
rental transactions are not sufficient. In particular, to what extent privatisation bene-
ficiaries in the NKGR who contributed their share to the stock of an agricultural en-
terprise under the 2003 legislation can still engage in land rental markets is unclear. 
Furthermore, land shares cannot be contributed to individual farms. It is also un-
known to what extent lease and sublease of land are still carried out informally, con-
trary to the 2003 land code provisions. More transparency and firmer as well as 
more practical legislation that creates a level playing field for all farm types would 
likely stimulate land rentals and thus lead to further efficiency gains in the medium 
term. 
  The state agency KazAgro appears to be one of the few viable sources of finance for 
many farmers, as commercial banks have partly withdrawn from the agricultural 
sector. However, it is unlikely that state-administered credit supply is very effective 
in targeting the most promising investments in agriculture. While some agricultural 
enterprises apparently have access to outside equity, many individual farmers would 
benefit from a more competitive and less centrally administered agricultural credit 
system, possibly based on (true) cooperative principles. 
  Many farmers interviewed in the case studies were concerned about future access to 
qualified labour. The Kazakh government should make sure that future labour de-
                                                 
16   See the case studies presented in Tomich et al. (1995). While neither the European Union nor the US 
agricultural policies provide blueprints for market-conform implementation systems, both cases dem-
onstrate that it can be economically costly if production incentives are primarily set by bureaucrats 
rather than consumers.    51 
mands in terms of educated people in working age can be met. A review of the 
demographic outlook for rural areas is recommended. 
  Recent increases in agricultural policy spending have led to a wide array of meas-
ures, including various types of input subsidies and production-related direct pay-
ments. To what extent these measures follow a consistent sector strategy with spe-
cific policy goals is not visible and the effectiveness of the measures thus difficult to 
evaluate. Many are hardly compatible with WTO standards. A more focused and 
less distortionary policy approach is recommended. Systematic upgrading of the ru-
ral transport infrastructure is likely to have a more beneficial long run impact than 
indiscriminate subsidy distribution.  
6.3  Future research needs 
There are a couple of areas that deserve further research in order to understand the real 
drivers of this apparent success, to identify the remaining weaknesses and obstacles to 
further development, and to evaluate the need for future policy attention: 
  Labour supervision and the design of incentive-compatible employment contracts 
are persistent issues for many managers. In this management field, little systematic 
knowledge is available about actual practice and possible options, including new 
technologies based on satellite imaging.  
  If labour is becoming scarce in rural Kazakhstan, this sheds new light on some stra-
tegic notions of rural development. Traditionally, in order to raise living standards, 
rural areas with abundant labour would have to generate off-farm employment op-
portunities and/or depend heavily on (regional) migration opportunities in more dy-
namic urban areas (Tomich et al., 1995; Collier and Dercon, 2009). In view of stable 
population numbers and strongly rising incomes, it is an open question whether this 
is an appropriate strategy for Kazakhstan. Deeper insights into the cause and effect 
relations among these empirical patterns would be required to resolve this issue. 
  No disaggregate, farm-level data is available that allows substantial comparisons in 
the performance of agricultural enterprises, individual farms and household econo-
mies. As a result, no definitive statements can be made about which type of organi-
sation is more beneficial in terms of productivity, employment and income genera-
tion, more innovative, and better suited to meet the demands of modern food chains. 
Given the tremendous range of farm sizes observed in a homogenous natural and 
political environment, the NKGR represents a potentially fruitful object to investi-
gate long-standing analytical issues concerning the relative advantages of small ver-
sus large farms (cf. recently Collier and Dercon, 2009). 
  There is clear evidence that many households produce a surplus to their subsistence 
needs which is looked after by, for example, urban consumers. In which way these 
household operations could and should be commercialised and what this means for 
other types of agricultural producers needs to be investigated further. 
  More research on the interactions among different types of agricultural producers is 
also needed because they may possibly become crucial in future scenarios of agri-
cultural development in the NKGR. If linkages indeed provide mutual benefits for 
the involved parties, they may turn into resource-providing contracts (Reardon et al., 52 
2009), i.e. arrangements that allow input flows from larger to smaller businesses in 
exchange for some output relevant for the larger business. In addition to traditional 
inputs such as fuel or feed, which are more likely to be fully commercialised today, 
this could also be knowledge, access to risk management tools, or storage and mar-
keting logistics. The output provided by the smaller business could be some effort-
intensive (intermediate) product, such as raw milk, or simply labour force. If there 
are economic advantages in keeping different types and sizes of producers separate, 
it is likely that a more refined network of contracts may emerge that exploits the 
comparative advantages of each organisational type. However, if there are no such 
economic benefits to separation, the mutual relationship is more likely to be one of 
competition and ultimate takeover by the stronger party. A third option is the in-
creasing specialisation of different farm types into various product segments. For 
example, tiny dairy producers could commercialise into a niche supplier for urban 
consumers, side by side the large farms specialised in grain. International experience 
shows that scale economies could certainly be relevant in dairy as well, leading to 
bigger production units in the medium run. 
  There is little information about who has entered agricultural production in North 
Kazakhstan and why. The range is from external investors bringing their own man-
agement, over various “local” entrepreneurs who have been more or less engaged in 
agricultural activities in the past, to household members who continue small-scale 
operations in vegetable and livestock to make their own living but also earn some 
revenue from surplus sales. Which of these entrepreneurs have entered their busi-
ness voluntarily and strategically, and which have become so by default? As farm 
enterprises in the NKGR have persistently been created and dismantled recently, and 
given the importance of the management for successful farming operations, this is a 
question of actual relevance. Relative political power and access to information and 
resources by these different types of managers may well have implications for future 
structural change in agriculture.  
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Appendix: Farm case studies 
Case 1: Enbek Bereke, a corporate crop farm 150 km north of Astana 
Legal form  Limited liability partnership 
Main area of activity  Crop production, seed propagation 
Land resources  12,000 ha 
Workers  35 full time 
 
The farm was established in 2007 on the basis of a former state farm, which had gone 
bankrupt and was idle for a number of years. Basic buildings and the remnants of a non-
functional drying and storing facility for grain still exist on the farm site. The farm cul-
tivates 12,000 ha. It produces beans, barley, wheat, oats, sunflower, linseed, sudan 
grass, and maize for silage. This exceptionally diverse cropping pattern is due to the fact 
that the farm engages in seed reproduction. Furthermore, some of the crops (beans, silo 
maize) are supplied to a nearby Angus cattle breeding farm run by the state breeding 
programme Kazbeef. The farm is a director-owned corporation (formally a limited li-
ability partnership). However, all land is in long-term leasehold by the villagers who ob-
tained this lease in the course of the state farm privatisation. These leaseholds were 
transferred into the capital stock of the farm managed by the current director. The direc-
tor came as an outsider to the local community. All primary leaseholders (and thus 
shareholders of the farm) earn an annual dividend based on the performance of the farm. 
The farm also provides social services to the village, in particular the school building 
and students’ meals. 
The farm employs 35 workers, including administrative personnel. 40 percent of the 
farm workers are also land owners. Many live in the nearby village. In 2011, workers 
will for the first time obtain performance pay based on GPS imaging. The agronomist 
says it is difficult to find workers for simple tasks such as grain shovelling in winter, 
while workers are more willing to engage in better paid and more responsible jobs such 
as tractor driving. The agronomist graduated from Astana Agricultural University. His 
only economic education was in economic theory.  
The farm has a contract with a major farm equipment manufacturer, which supplies 
state-of-the-art machinery at preferential conditions. In turn, the farm acts as a model 
operation and is open to visitors. A full GPS based monitoring system is used, including 
track control of the tractor. Data from the tractors is transferred via memory sticks. The 
farm uses latest zero-tillage technology and a non-selective herbicide for clearing the 
weeds before sowing. The sowing campaign is from May 5 to June 5, there is one addi-
tional spraying operation using a self-propelled sprayer. Fertiliser is applied simultane-
ously with sowing. The fertiliser applied mostly originates from Kazakh sources. This is 
subsidised, although it is of lower quality than that from Uzbekistan or Russia. The di-
rector considers putting up new storage facilities. So far the grain was wrapped in silo 
bags over winter outside the buildings, which also seemed to work well. The farm owns 
a specialised machinery to wrap the grain. The farm obtains input and Diesel subsidies 
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as well as an area payment of 350 KZT per ha of wheat. Other crops yield even higher 
subsidies, e.g. 650 KZT/ha for silo maize and 2282 KZT for oilseeds. Investment subsi-
dies are obtained for machinery manufactured in Kazakhstan.  
Case 2: Rodina, a corporate dairy farm 50 km northwest of Astana 
Legal form  Limited liability partnership 
Main area of activity  Dairy (400 cows), separate crop division 
Land resources  52,000 ha 
Workers  19 full time in dairy 
 
The farm emerged from a former dairy sovkhoz, which hosted about 2,000 cows. It had 
severe economic difficulties before the current fifty-year old director took over the op-
erations. The director is well known in the region for his entrepreneurial attitude and his 
social engagement for the local community. He is supposed to have an eye on local em-
ployment creation, which is why the two villages located adjacent to the farm had be-
come attractive for in-migrants from other places of Kazakhstan. The farm is organised 
as a limited liability partnership. 51 percent of the land is held by the director, the other 
49 percent belong to local residents, who receive an annual dividend on their share. The 
dairy complex of the farm hosts 400 Holstein-Frisian dairy cows which were imported 
as live animals from Canada in 2007. They are currently milked two times a day, at 6 
am and 6 pm. The average milk yield per day is 20 kg. The diet consists of hay, silage 
and concentrate, which is offered as a total mix ration. Given the milk output actually 
realised and the contents of the fodder mix as explained by the milking technician, the 
energy concentration appears to be (too) low. One reason for this fact may be that the 
fodder is mostly produced on-farm, by the crop division of the farm cultivating 52,000 
ha. It produces wheat, barley, sunflower and corn, as well as fodder crops for the dairy 
cows. The dairy operation uses artificial insemination technology and has the increase 
of milk output as a breeding target. Milking is done in a 50 slot rotary milking parlour. 
The target herd size of the farm is 2,200 cows, to be reached within the next years. The 
farm also comprises a dairy processing complex, mostly producing packed fresh milk 
and other fresh milk products such as kefir. These products are sold to Astana and other 
urban centres. The revenue for a litre of packed milk is currently at 120 KZT. The raw 
milk price is at 100 KZT/kg. Concentrate can be bought for 50 KZT/kg. 
There are 19 workers in the milking operation, but overall employment is much higher. 
Workers in the milking complex obtain a monthly base salary, which is topped up if 
quantity and quality targets are exceeded. This regime applies for milkers and workers 
involved in feeding. The dairy complex consists of four new buildings and the milking 
house, all equipped with imported Western technology. Funding for this came from 
wheat sales and a seven year loan from the state fund Kazagrofinance.   59 
Case 3: JSC Petrovska, a former sovkhoz 175 km northwest of Astana 
Legal form  Joint Stock Company 
Main area of activity  Crop and livestock 
Land resources  25,000 ha 
Workers unknown 
 
This is a Joint Stock Company operating on 25,000 ha. It emerged from a former sovk-
hoz and has machinery stations in surrounding villages. Half of the land still belongs to 
the villagers living nearby the farm. Several of the land owners also work on the farm. 
Individual farmers in the villages around it regard it as quite competitive and seem un-
able to bid land out of it. The competition for workers is also very strong. 
Case 4: Saratomar, an individual wheat farm 100 km southeast of Kokshetaw 
Legal form  Individual farm 
Main area of activity  Wheat production, bakery 
Land resources  650 ha 
Workers  4 in agriculture, 60 in bakery 
 
The farm is situated in the town of Makinsk, where the owner also runs a bakery. This 
town hosted a factory for engine parts during Soviet times, but the factory went bank-
rupt and its machinery was sold to neighbouring countries. The about fifty year old 
agronomist of the farm had previously worked as an agricultural engineer on a corporate 
farm. The farm is family owned and cultivates 650 ha of wheat. The land was rented 
from the government in 1997 as a 49-year leasehold. Until 1990, it had been cultivated 
by a kolkhoz, after that by a corporate farm which went bankrupt. The current owner 
had no relation to this corporate farm. The agronomist states that several individual 
farms created in the 1990s did not survive. According to the agronomist, land expansion 
is difficult, as there is little supply. Occasionally a farm goes bankrupt, then the land is 
quickly distributed among neighbouring farms. The farm has an additional income from 
real estate management. 
There are four workers employed in agricultural production. The farm operates a system 
of performance pay for the tractorists. For sowing, they obtain a base payment depend-
ing on the area they drilled. The work is assessed after germination and the pay is dou-
bled if all seedlings have appeared on the surface. Additional top-ups are granted after 
the harvest. In winter, the workers do subsidiary work in the farm-bakery enterprise, but 
they do not get unemployed. A main problem of the farm is to find reliable and quali-
fied workers. Access to credit appears to be a minor problem. Banks used machinery as 
collateral in the past, furthermore a good repayment history is important. Land is not 
used as collateral. The farm operates with a used K-700 tractor and used combines, but 
has new tractors and trucks of CIS origin. Obtaining inputs is also not regarded as diffi-
cult. Seed is newly bought all three to four years from other farms, in the meantime it is 
kept from the own wheat harvest. The farm uses zero-tillage technology and cultivates 60 
wheat in monoculture, with the occasional exception of oats or peas cultivation to fix 
nitrogen in the soil. A GPS-based system is used to control spraying operations and the 
performance of tractorists. It is not used for sowing, as the sowing campaign is only one 
week. According to the agronomist, the minimum subscription to GPS services is one 
month, so it is too expensive for such a small farm. All the wheat is processed in the 
own bakery, which also buys wheat from other farms. In the bakery, situated on the 
farm site, there work 60 persons in three shifts. The bakery delivers a factory outlet in 
the farm and additional bakery stores in neighbouring villages, which are delivered by 
an own fleet of small trucks. 
Case 5: Individual vegetable farm Niva, 30 km south of Astana 
Legal form  Individual farm 
Main area of activity  Vegetables, grains, pigs, sheep 
Land resources  538 ha 
Workers  6 full-time, 50 seasonal 
 
The individual farm was established in 1997 by the owner who first rented land as a 49-
year leasehold from the government. He later bought land under the new ownership leg-
islation of 2005. The price for pastures was 28 thousand KZT/ha (190 USD/ha), the 
price for arable land 44 thousand KZT/ha (300 USD/ha). The land was formerly culti-
vated by a sovkhoz, from which his father and other family members had obtained 
shares in the privatisation process. The owner is a former construction engineer. He 
started farming because his parents had a relation to it and he grew up in a village. Now 
he owns about 538 ha, of which 238 ha are pastures. On the remaining 300 ha, he culti-
vates 130 ha of grain (wheat, barley) and 70 ha of vegetables (cucumber, potatoes, to-
matoes, cabbage). Vegetables have been grown since 2003. A part of the grain is fed to 
the farm’s livestock which is kept in a different place; about 40 pigs as well as sheep 
and poultry. Another part is used for own consumption, yet another part is given to the 
workers as a part of their salary.  
There are six permanent workers on the farm, plus about 50 seasonal workers. Workers 
are paid according to the overall performance of the farm. They obtain a monthly base 
payment: the overall payment is then assessed at the end of the season. There is a sea-
sonal production target. If this is achieved, the salary is doubled. The seasonal workers 
are contracted for a period of seven months. The farmer employs a group of seasonal 
workers from Uzbekistan who come regularly every year, some for five years in a row, 
others already for eight years. They live in small cabins on the farm. The owner has an 
Uzbek partner, a former irrigation engineer for vegetables from Tashkent. The buildings 
of the farm consist of a couple of small sheds and shelters which were erected in the 
midst of the arable land and which can be reached only via a bumpy dirt road.  
Seed and fertiliser purchases are subsidised by the government, obtaining these inputs is 
not a problem. The owner regularly orders a railroad freight car with fertiliser together 
with a couple of neighbouring independent farms, which sometimes has raised coordi-
nation problems in the past. The farmer has used commercial credit and is a member of 
a governmentally sponsored Rural Credit Partnership. Commercial bank loans are also   61 
available. He took one seasonal loan for one million KZT, at a rate of 13 percent inter-
est. His wife, a public servant, acted as a loan guarantor with her salary. Given addi-
tional fees and transaction costs, the total rate amounted to 18 percent. Occasionally, the 
farmer also had borrowed money from friends and relatives. The Credit Partnership is 
operating at the rayon level and has 24 members. It was founded due to a government 
initiative in 2004. Each member had to deposit one million KZT as a share. He recently 
borrowed a loan for one year worth 10.5 million KZT, using his residential house as 
collateral. The interest rate is 8 percent, thus considerably lower than the commercial 
credit. In addition, the farmer has a credit line with the Credit Partnership. Credit Part-
nerships are funded by the Agrarian Credit Corporation (AKK), which has a govern-
ment-funded budget. The AKK gives loans to the regional credit cooperatives at a rate 
of 4 percent. The available loan volume is seven times the deposits of the Partnerships. 
The AKK has the final decision right about extending loans to farmers, and credit pro-
posals made by farmers to the Partnerships have to be submitted to the AKK via the 
Partnerships. This system has been implemented in the entire country. The farmer owns 
three used caterpillar tractors of Soviet making, wheel tractors, and combines. The 
farmer is a member of the Republican public union “Union of Fermers of Kazakhstan” 
which represents the individual farms of Kazakhstan (6000 members, founded in 2001). 
The farmer seems to be quite satisfied with the governmental support he obtains. He 
finds it difficult to obtain additional land and workers. He also has plans to build a vege-
table storage facility, which is hampered by the bureaucratic hurdles and costs of trans-
forming arable land into land designated for buildings. So far all his preliminary build-
ings were put up illegally. 
The vegetables are sold to regional city markets via middlemen. With some of the mid-
dlemen the owner has contracts, some of them pay the product in cash at the field, oth-
ers after they sold it on the market. The vegetables are inspected by the city health au-
thority of Astana, which also issues a certificate. 
Case 6: Beloe Osero individual farm, 150 km northwest of Astana 
Legal form  Individual farm 
Main area of activity  Wheat production, beef (250 pieces of cattle) 
Land resources  2,000 ha 
Workers  8 full-time, 3-4 seasonal 
 
The farm was founded in 1998 upon the remnants of a bankrupt kolkhoz. It has since 
been operated by a former construction engineer originating from the local village Beloe 
Osero (white lake). The farm cultivates 2,000 ha in total, of which 1,300 ha were taken 
over from former inhabitants of the village. These were ethnic Germans who left the vil-
lage and sold their use-rights to the current farmer. An additional 700 ha were rented for 
49 years from the government. The total land divides into 1200 ha of arable land and 
800 ha of pastures. On the arable land, 1000 ha of wheat are grown and 200 ha of bar-
ley. The pasture is used to feed 250 heads of cattle. These are (the offspring of) previous 
dairy cows. In winter, they are kept in a self-constructed barn and fed with hay and 
grain concentrate. Until 2006, the farm kept about 50 dairy cows which were milked by 
hand. The farmer estimates their milk output to be at about 3 to 4,000 kg per year. But 62 
this was not profitable and he did not have the necessary equipment to continue this op-
eration. The manure is occasionally distributed to the fields by borrowing a spreader 
from a nearby former sovkhoz. 
The farmer has eight workers under permanent contract, plus three to four seasonal 
workers in the summer. Payment of the workers depends on their fulfilment of a norm 
set in the beginning of season, for example a certain number of hectares to be sown per 
day. Over- or under-fulfilment leads to top-ups or reductions of the salary. It does not 
directly depend on yield levels or profits at the end of the season.  
Live animals are regularly sold to a slaughterhouse in the regional capital. A kilo-
gramme of beef is subsidised by the government with 80 KZT. However, grain produc-
tion is generally assessed to be more profitable than beef. Also fodder use is subsidised. 
The farmer has a contract with the regional Kazagroinnovation center to breed in Here-
ford cattle to improve the meat output. Otherwise he obtains little professional help, but 
has many contacts to neighbouring farms. For the crops, mineral fertiliser is only used 
in some years, while seed is bought from a nearby former sovkhoz. The harvest is sold 
to the elevator in Shortandy, the farm has no storage facilities. Over recent years, the 
farmer has continuously increased his stock of used farming machinery, generally of 
Soviet origin (e.g., three K-700 tractors). He recently bought two combine harvesters for 
which a 16 million KZT credit was taken from the Rural Credit Partnership. Currently, 
he still owes 4 million KZT. The interest was 9 percent. The loan was taken for five 
years. To become a member of the Partnership, the farmer had to make a deposit of 1.2 
million KZT. The coop took machinery and his land as collateral. The farmer is a mem-
ber of the Republican public union “Union of Fermers of Kazakhstan” which represents 
the independent farms of Kazakhstan. The farmer’s wife is at home in the village with 
four children.  
Case 7: Murat’s farm, an individual sheep farm near Karaganda 
Legal form  Individual farm 
Main area of activity  Sheep meat (250 heads) 
Land resources  400 ha 
Workers unknown 
 
The owner operates a sheep herd of 250 heads, producing meat and selling live animals 
for breeding purposes to other producers. Previous to his farming business, he was a 
building engineer in a corporate farm. Since 2003, when he started the operation, he has 
rented 400 ha of pasture in 49-year lease from the government. There is no rent to be 
paid, only taxes. He is currently planning to expand his farm by renting another 100 ha 
from the government. In this course he intends to apply for government support with the 
help of the state-operated Kazagromarketing office in Astana. He says the first years 
were economically difficult, but more recently he ran a successful operation. It is not 
too difficult to get credit from local banks and many neighbouring individual farms use 
it to finance their operations. Proximity to the city is advantageous. The farm is situated 
near the city of Karaganda, where the farm serves a market for directly marketed lamb 
meat. All meat is sold in this way to local consumers.    63 
Case 8: Household farms in Beloe Osero, 150 km northwest of Astana 
Organisational form  Household economy 
Main area of activity  Dairy, home gardening 
Land resources  about 0.5 ha 
Workers family  members 
 
There are typical household farms (household plots) in Beloe Osero. They own two or 
three cows which are milked by hand. Because in Kazakhstan fresh milk is currently in 
short supply, the regional dairy company from Shortandy (50 km distance) is coming to 
the village on a daily basis and collects the milk. During summer, the cows are grazing 
on public pastures, which can be used for free. Additional concentrate is bought.  
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